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I. INTRODUCTION

Where the 1960's was the decade of the 'explosive growth' of collective bargaining for teachers in elementary and secondary
schools, the 1970's will witness the arrival of collective bargaining
as the primary vehicle of faculty participation in the governance
of institutions of higher learning.'
Whether the above prediction will occur at any particular campus may
depend on the alternatives available to the faculty and how effective
they are. The purpose of this article is to describe the alternatives available to a faculty desiring a greater degree of self-government and to
delineate the problems inherent in those alternatives.
Traditionally, college and university faculties have chosen means
other than collective bargaining as a system of faculty governance to
1. Address by Donald Wollett, Trends in the Law of Collective Negotiations in
Education, unpublished speech presented February 9, 1970, National Symposium on
Colective Negotiation in Education, Feb. 9, 1970, summarized in Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL.
REP. B-6, No. 337 (Feb. 23, 1970).
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represent their interests. There are, however, recent indications that
collective bargaining is becoming more acceptable. Section II deals with
the campus setting, analyzing the various collegial structures in higher
education, the response of their faculties to collective bargaining and
the common issues argued by opponents and proponents of unionism,
Section III presents the alternative types of organizations available
to a faculty for faculty governance including a faculty senate and a
collective bargaining agent; also shown are alternative methods of settling disputes including the use of persuasion, neutral third-parties, and
coercion (including the strike), and the likely methods each alternative
type of organization might prefer.
Section IV analyzes the role and extent that federal and state legislation play in a system of faculty governance should a collective bargaining agent be chosen. It also points up the potential problem areas that
need further examination, including the concepts of exclusivity, scope
of bargaining, appropriate bargaining unit and the role of a faculty
senate in collective bargaining.
Section V concludes that by studying the alternatives and the merits
of each of them, a faculty can make a more informed judgment of its
preferred method of self-government.
II.

THE CAMPUS SETTING

A. The Nature of Higher Education
1. General Observations
Higher education, which may be defined as all post-secondary education including vocational schools, community and junior colleges, and
colleges and universities with their graduate and professional schools, 2
is generally recognized as an investment in the future well-being of the
nation. The cultural, social, economic, and industrial advancement of
the nation is becoming more and more vitally linked with the services of
higher education. "These institutions are indeed the fountains of new
knowledge, fundamental to the growth and progress of society. Even
more important, they form the supporting base for the maintenance of
our democratic way of life." 3
Enrollments in institutions of higher education have nearly doubled
in the past decade and have led to a parallel expansion of the number
2. H. SMITH,
3. Id. at 1.

STATE PLAN FOR HIGHER EDUCATION IN MICHIGAN 9 (1968).
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of full and part-time faculty members, now numbering about 400,000. 4 These educators occupy a sphere of growing importance in
our society in that they are entrusted with the education and intellectual
formation of our nation's children. Teachers and professors are in a
position to fashion thoughts and ideas, goals and directions; and because
of their important role in the fabric of our national community, their
professional activities are viewed with keen interest.5 The question then
arises whether or not "professional activities" include designation by
faculties of collective bargaining agents, based on the industrial model,
to bargain for them?
It has been suggested that faculties of higher education will follow
the lead taken by teachers at the secondary education level who are
apparently answering the question affirmatively.6 Proponents of unionism in secondary education state flatly that until a trade union approach
was used in schools, teachers were continuing to be paid in false professional prestige rather than in dollars.7 In a recent survey to determine,
among other things, the extent to which collective bargaining increased
teachers' salaries in Michigan, findings were made that "bargaining seems
to have produced pay increases averaging 10-20 percent higher than what
teachers would otherwise have received ... ." 8
The author of that survey states that the lesson is simply that "hard
collective bargaining accompanied by the threat of strikes has paid sub4. AIERicAN ASSOCIATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION TASK FORCE REPORT, FACULTY PARTICIPATION IN ACADEmIC GOVERNANCE 9 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
5. Neirynck, Teacher's Strikes-A New Militancy, 19 LAB. L. J. 292 (1968).
6. Michigan is illustrative of the national trend of secondary (and elementary)
teachers forming unions. In 1965, Michigan law authorized public employees, including
school teachers, to organize into labor organizations and to bargain collectively with

public employers over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.
MICH. Com. LAWS ANN. § 423.208 (1965). Two years later, more than three quarters

of Michigan's 590 school districts had recognized unions. C. REHMUS & E. WILNER,
YARs 2 (1968).
7. Muir, The Strike As A Professional Sanction: The Changing Attitude of the
National Education Association, 19 LAB. L. J. 615, 618 (1968).
THE ECONOMIC RESULTS OF TEACHER BARGAINING: MICHIGAN'S FIRST Two

8. The survey also found that in the four years prior to the enactment of Michigan's
public employee law
the annual increase in the salary for inexperienced

teachers in the 12

districts studied [all now had unionized faculties] averaged 3 percent. In
the first two years of bargaining, the average annual increase was three
times as large, about 9 percent. The comparable figures for fully experienced teachers holding Master's degrees were 31 percent in the four
years preceding bargaining, and 11 and 10 percent in the first two bargaining years.
C. REHMiUS & E. WLNER, supra note 6, at 30.

1970]

PROFESSORS AND UNIONS

stantial dividends to organized teachers." 9 Faculty members in institudons of higher education are looking at this type of experience and
asking why the same "dividends" can not be realized by them. 0 With
such issues being raised, it is helpful to examine briefly the various institutions of higher education, noting similarities and dissimilarities as
regards basic goals of the institutions and of their faculties. With this
information, it is hoped that insights may be gained into why some college faculties have rejected traditional methods of academic governance
and have instead looked to the trade-union model of decision-making.

2. Community and Junior Colleges
Community and junior colleges provide occupational and apprentice
programs leading to a two-year terminal degree or, more commonly,
provide a program in which the first two years count as college work
for those desiring and able to transfer to four-year colleges and universides.": Traditionally, they have acted in close association with secondary schools, providing students with supplementary skills and technical abilities.
During the 1960's, enrollment in junior colleges increased at a rate
nearly twice that of four-year institutions until today there are 800
junior or community colleges in the United States with almost 1.5
million students. 1 2 Faculty unrest and involvement in labor organization is most intense among the faculties of these institutions.'" This point
is vividly illustrated in Michigan where faculties of 24 of the 29 two9. Id. at 31. Apparently, there is no available data as to comparable salary increases
realized by non-union teachers outside the twelve school districts studied.
10. One author has suggested that the economic benefits to be derived from
collective bargaining in higher education are more imaginary than real, citing as an
example an 8.5 percent salary increase at Henry Ford Community College obtained
by an exclusive bargaining agent after resort to a strike; however, he noted "the
increase was no greater than some of the increases won by a neighboring junior
college in the same state without any exclusive bargaining, without a strike, and
earlier in the year." Larsen, 'Collective Bargaining' Issues in the California State
Colleges, 53 AMERICAN AssocAnoN oF UNivERsITY PRoFEssoRs BuLLErN 217, 225 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as AAUP BULL.].
11. See H. SmriTH, supra note 2, at 14. In Michigan, community and junior colleges
are generally synonomous; however many states designate community colleges as those
providing vocational courses and junior colleges as those providing credits transferrable
to a four year college.
12. Rehmus, Collective Bargaining and the Market for Academic Personnel, 8 Q. R.
EcoN. AND Bus. 7, 8 (1968).

13. Id. at 8. See also TAsK FORcE REPORT, supra note 4, at 10, 37; Ferguson, Collective
Bargaining in Universities and Colleges, 19 LAB. L. J. 778, 800 (1968).
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year public institutions have designated collective bargaining agents,
Of these 29 schools, approximately 2300 of the 2600 faculty members
are covered by collective bargaining agreements. 14
An important reason why junior college faculties have unionized
is their desire for higher wages. In that regard, unions have in many
cases met expectations. For example, in Michigan it has been stated that
negotiated increases in the Ph.D. salary schedule in community colleges
have often been considerably higher than those given voluntarily by the
four-year colleges and universities. Today in Michigan, the new doctor
of philosophy will be about as well paid in many community colleges
as he will at any other institution. 5
The historical ties of the junior colleges with the elementary and secondary school system have been given as part of the reason for junior
colleges being the "most successful breeding ground" for gains for collective bargaining agents." Recently, however, there has been a major
change in the nature and administration of these two-year colleges in
that many are, for the first time, becoming a part of the formal system
of higher education. Whereas formerly these institutions were under
the control of local boards of education which also governed elementary
and secondary education, many have now been integrated into a district
or statewide community or junior college system placing strong emphasis
7
on the role of providing the'first two years of college work.'
14. As of May 1, 1970, the AFT's Michigan affiliate, MFT, had four of the agreements, NEA's Michigan affiliate, MEA, had fifteen agreements and nonaffiliated locals
had five agreements. Interview with Charles Belknap, Consultant on Higher Education
for the Michigan Education Association, May 21, 1970.
15. Rehmus, supra note 12, at 10. Two years after this observation, it appears that
Michigan universities are meeting and exceeding rising junior college faculty salaries.
For comparisons of faculty salaries in community colleges in Michigan see MIcarGAX
AssoCIATION

OF

HIGHR

EDUCATION,

SUMMARY

OF

COMMUNITY

CoLLEGE

SALARY

ScHEDULES, 1969-70 (1970). A few of the beginning salaries for community college
faculty members with doctoral degrees as compared with two Michigan four year
universities in 1969-70 are Henry Ford-9400; Alpena-$8,845; Glen Oaks-$9500;
salaries for assistant professors (the rank at which Ph. D. faculty would normally be
hired) are: Central Michigan University $10,000; University of Michigan, (a) College
of Education-11,000; (b) College of Business Administration-$12,000. Figures were
not available for Michigan's other eleven four year public institutions. University
figures based on interview with Charles Allmand, Assistant to Vice President for
Academic Affairs at the University of Michigan, June 19, 1970.
16. Ferguson, supra note 13, at 800. Professor Donald Wollet of the University of
California at Davis recently stated that there are at least 76 junior colleges having

collective bargaining agreements with their faculties. Tan

EDUCATION 1 (May 25, 1970).
17. TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra note

4, at 10.

CHRONCLE

OF HisRma
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Often, community and junior college teachers are former public
school teachers who have brought with them their teaching approaches,
and their attitudes regarding their relationship with the administration."8
This, combined with the fact that junior college administrators are also
frequently selected from the ranks of secondary schools where an
autocratic tradition of management has long been the norm, makes for
a potential extension of secondary school attitudes in the administration
of junior colleges. 19 Although the faculties of many junior colleges have
sought to improve their professional status by achieving an expanded
role in campus governance, many are still tied to attitudes in which the
concepts of professionalism are underdeveloped or non-existent.
In community and junior colleges without a traditional unit of selfgovernment, such as a faculty senate, faculty members may find responsible parties unreceptive to their requests, simply because no forum has
been established to guarantee communication between faculty and administration. Thus, a feeling of frustration develops which results in
a demand for a greater role in institutional government2 0 As the junior
and community colleges lean more toward emphasizing college courses,
rather than technical skills, so also are the faculties seeking college professors' traditional academic status and rights of participation. Where
these desires are not being realized, faculty members are seeking alternative methods by which they may gain control over the role they play
in the institution's government. An increasing number of these faculties are choosing collective bargaining as their alternative. Whether this
method of faculty governance will enhance a faculty member's opportunity to obtain more power over decisions which will affect and determine his professional role and well-being will be tested at each unionized
institution.
A related situation now confronts college educators:
If the faculty members at junior colleges have been aroused by
the demand for powers that they never had, the faculty members
at many of the four-year institutions have become restive over the
loss of control that they once thought was theirs.21
18. Brown, Collective Bargaining in Higher Education, 67 MicH. L. REv. 1067 (1969);
Marmion, Unions and Higher Education, 49 Enuc. REc. 41 (1968).

19. Brown, supra note 18.
20. See generally Larsen, supranote 10, at 225.
21. TASK FORcE REPORT, supranote 4, at 12.
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3. Colleges and Universities
There is a great diversity among the many colleges and universities
across the nation. The most apparent distinction is between private and
public institutions, each having different sponsors and, therefore, somewhat different responsibilities and methods of financing 2 However,
their educational goals and interests, as well as those of their faculties,
are often similar, if not identical. Since most new college and university expansion is in the area of public higher education, and enrollment
is greater there, this study deals primarily with public institutions. There
is very little that will be discussed, however, which will be inapposite
for private colleges.
(a) ProfessorialResponsibilities
The basic areas of study in colleges and universities can be divided
3
into the general categories of undergraduate and graduate education
Undergraduate education is usually a four-year program leading to a
baccalaureate degree with most of the study done within a particular
college. This college may be a separate entity such as a teacher's college, or it may be part of a multi-college university. Its main purpose
is to provide students with a general education. Graduate and professional education encompasses all education beyond the undergraduate
level. It differs from undergraduate education not only in level but
in kind, in that its purpose is to prepare students in a specialized area
of study which requires greater scholarship by both student and faculty.
Graduate school is usually an extension of the undergraduate college;
whereas, professional schools are a separate entity within a university.
It has been said that a faculty is the university. Traditionally, its
area of concern has encompassed academic standards, faculty selection
and promotion, curriculum planning, salary matters, and those aspects
of student life which relate to the educational process. The university
professor spends most, if not all, of his time on academic matters, primarily involving himself with the transmission of knowledge to stu22. In 1968, there were approximately 1000 public institutions and 1489 private
institutions. Public colleges and universities tend to be larger and grow faster than
their private counterparts with 29 percent of the student population enrolled in private
colleges and univwrsides (2,102,000 students). See AMERICAN CouNcIL ON EDUCATION,
A FACT BOOK ON HIGHER EDUCATION 8117, 9009 (1969).
23. H. SMITH, supra note 2, at 9.
24. TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 27.
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dents.2 5 Typically, he will meet twelve hours of classes a week, and
in addition to ministerial duties, hold irregular conferences with students. Although helpful at promotion time, research and writing are
not required and are performed only to the extent appropriate to meet
the requirements of the teaching function. 6
Normally, the graduate or professional faculty member will meet
formal classes six to eight hours a week and hold conferences to direct
advanced work by graduate students. Additionally, he is expected to
carry on substantial research and writing, undertaking such teaching as
is appropriate to his function as a creative scholar. Thus, the total work
load of either an undergraduate or graduate faculty member is for most
purposes about the same, although the nature of the work may differ.
With these types of responsibilities, it is interesting to note by which
type of organization college and university professors will choose to
govern themselves. In this sector of higher education, there still appears
to be a relative scarcity of formal collective bargaining between faculties and their administrations, at least as compared with its widespread
use in the junior colleges. There is mounting evidence, however, indicating that unionization of college and university faculties will become
27
more common.

(b) Survey of Collective Bargainingby Faculties
During the current year and in recent years, a dramatic increase has
occurred in the number of faculties which have embraced collective
25. An academic faculty at a university consists of many non-teaching faculty
members such as library and research personnel; however, because most faculties have
not included these groups within their system of faculty governance, they are not
discussed under this section.
26. A study of 1000 faculty members at a large university showed that 32 percent
had not published any articles and 71 percent had not published any books. Wilson,
The Academic Man Revisited, STUDIEs oF COLLEE FAcuLTX 5 (The Western Interstate
Commission for Higher Education 1961).
27. One writer suggests
the most important deterrent to membership [in unions at the college
level] remains the reluctance of teachers to become identified with bluecollar workers. The majority of teachers come from what sociologists
term 'upwardly mobile' families-a group that is strongly white-collar
conscious. This bias, coupled with lack of real interest among college
teachers . . . may offer formidable roadblocks to entrance of the public

school organizations onto the college or university campuses in any
great numbers.
Brown, Collective Bargaining on the Campus: Professors, Associations and Unions,
21 LAB. L. J. 167, 176 (1970).
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bargaining. It has been predicted that this trend will increase more dramatically over the next two or three years.2 8
In recent years, unions and professional associations have made the
following organizational claims. As of 1967, the American Federation

of Teachers claimed 104 locals at the college level;29 however, it has
been duly noted that despite its relatively numerous affiliate chapters, it
"probably did not have more than a dozen contracts in effect at the end
of 1968." 30

The National Education Association, on the other hand, claimed that
by 1967 it represented eight college faculties, having negotiated collective bargaining agreements for three of them. 31 The American Association of University Professors, as of 1968, represented only one faculty
and had negotiated a contract there.3 2 Development of unionization of
faculties in recent years has been mild when compared with the activities
of the past year.
New York, with its sophisticated public employee legislation, has
witnessed the greatest increase in unionization of college faculties.33 In
the fall of 1969, the Legislative Conference, now an affiliate of the NEA,
representing City University of New York's full-time professional staff,
and the United Federation of College Teachers (UFCT-AFT), an
affiliate of the AFT, representing the university's part-time professional
staff, negotiated separate contracts with officials of the City University
of New York. These two contracts are believed "....

to be 'firsts' in the

sense they include a complex publicly supported higher educational
system, including four-year undergraduate institutions, covering nearly
10,000 professionals." S4
28. Address by McHugh, Recent Developments in Collective Bargaining in HigherEducation, speech presented at the June, 1970, meeting of the National Association
of College and University Attorneys, San Diego, California, June, 1970, to be published

in

COLLEGE CoUNsEL.

29. Ferguson, supra note 13, at 800-01. By May, 1970, the American Federation of
Teacher's Director of Colleges and Universities, Richard Hixon, claimed 200 locals
on college campuses. THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (May 25, 1970).
30. Brown, supra note 18, at 1067-68.
31. Ferguson, supranote 13, at 800-01.
32. Id. Since that time it has been designated collective bargaining agent for the
faculties at Rutgers, St. John's University and Oakland University. See McHugh,
supra note 28.
S3. In the fall of 1969, of thirty community colleges outside New York City, there
were 16 negotiated contracts. McHugh, Collective Negotiations in Public Higher
Education, 47 COL. & UNIV. Bus. 41, 42 (1969).
34. Id. at 43.
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At State University of New York a representation proceeding was
commenced by various labor organizations, including AFT and AAUP
affiliates and the State University Faculty Senate, all of which sought to
represent the approximately 11,000 faculty members as its bargaining
agent. 5 A hearing was held before the state labor board which found
the appropriate bargaining unit to be a statewide employee unit of all
professional employees. An election was anticipated in early 1971.
New York has also had faculties from its private colleges seek union
representation.a6 In March, 1970, a representation election was held at
St. John's University among full-time and regular part-time faculty with
the Faculty Association and the AAUP on the ballot. Subsequently, the
Faculty Association and AAUP agreed to be jointly certified, and they
are currently engaged in negotiations with the St. John's University
37
administration.
In New Jersey, faculties of public institutions have also formed unions.
In 1969, elections were held at each of the six New Jersey State Colleges S8 The local chapter of the New Jersey State Faculty Association
(SFA), an affiliate of the New Jersey Education Association and NEA,
won the election and was certified at each of the campuses. In the summer of 1969, negotiations were commenced between SFA and the New
Jersey State Board of Higher Education on a state-wide-level for all
six campuses, while simultaneous negotiations on local issues were held
at the local campuses. Negotiations stalled when it became unclear
whether SFA should bargain with the Governor's office or the Board of
Higher Education. An impasse was reached on the issues of salary,
binding arbitration, and the duration of the contract. Meditation was
attempted and failed. Thereafter, negotiations resumed only to reach
another impasse. A fact-finder was called in, but to date he has rendered
no decision.
35. McHugh, supra note 28.
36. Although faculties at Cornell and Syracuse Universities have not requested a
representation election, the universities recently petitioned for and obtained jurisdiction
of the NLRB over their non-academic employees. See Cornell University, 183 NLRB
No. 41, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1970).
37. McHugh, supra note 28. The results of the election were Faculty Association:
225; AAUP:215; challenged:23; void:3. Interestingly, the law faculty at St. John's
University 'was not included in the faculty unit currently engaged in negotiations,
and it has recently petitioned the state labor relations board. Its unit includes full-time
and adjunct professors but not visiting lecturers. The bargaining agent is an independent
organization called the Law Committee on Collective Bargaining. Negotiations have
not yet begun. Id.
38. McHugh, supra note 28.
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At Rutgers University, the AAUP chapter was recently designated
as collective bargaining agent for the entire faculty, excluding the professional support staffY9 Negotiations began in early 1970 and tentative
agreement has been reached on the total salary increase, but not as to
its manner of distribution whether by merit or by across the board
increase. The entire percentage increase is subject to approval by the
executive branch of the state government which has not yet acted.
Faculties at Michigan's public universities have also recently expressed
interest in unions. In September, 1969, the Michigan Association of
Higher Education was certified as the bargaining agent for Central
Michigan University's faculty. The faculty unit included full-time
faculty members holding the rank of lecturer or above and who carried
a work-load of at least one-half teaching and research. 40 A contract
was negotiated in March, 1970.
At Oakland University, the AAUP filed a petition in April, 1970,
seeking to represent academic rank faculty, post doctoral fellows, librarians, and instructors. 4 ' At the time the petition was filed, Oakland
was in the process of severing its affiliation with Michigan State University, and the state labor board held the representation election in abeyance until that transaction was completed.42 In the fall of 1970, the
_AAUP won the representation election and bargaining was scheduled
to begin in January, 1971.
The faculty at one of the fourteen colleges of Michigan State University petitioned for a representation election seeking to designate
the Michigan Association for Higher Education as its bargaining agent.A3
The proposed unit would include faculty rank staff, but exclude deans,
assistant and associate deans and department chairmen. The matter is
presently before the state labor board.44
At the University of Michigan, separate petitions have been filed by
the Intern-Residents Union seeking to represent interns, residents and
39. Id.
40. The bargaining unit also included librarians, coaches, counselors, department
chairmen, and part-time faculty who carry a two-thirds load. Excluded were graduate
assistants, visiting faculty, directors, coordinators, deans, vice presidents and president.
Interview with Charles Belknap, supra note 14.
41. McHugh, supra note 28.
42. Oakland's independence came on July 1, 1970. Interview with William P.
Lemmer, attorney for the University of Michigan (Nov. 10, 1970).
43. Id.
44. The University contends that the appropriate unit would be the faculty of all

the colleges. A decision from the state labor board was expected by early fall, 1970. Id.
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fellows, and by the teaching Fellows Union seeking to represent teaching fellows.4 5 Both matters are presently before the state labor board,
with the University contending that teaching fellows are not employees
but students whose work functions are part of their educational program. It adds that, if they are employees, their bargaining unit should
appropriately include other graduate students whose employment responsibilities are part of their educational program.
Soine faculty members at a number of state colleges in New Mexico,
Arizona, California, and Pennsylvania have also sought collective bargaining in the past year, but were unsuccessfuL48 Whether the faculties'
selection of unions at large public institutions is a trend which will continue or whether it is merely experimentation with different methods
of faculty governance is speculative. That the former will be the case
is suggested by two recent surveys in which selected faculties indicated
that, although collective bargaining may be ill-advised, it is probably
inevitable.
The American Council of Education reported a survey which showed
that 75 percent of faculty members queried thought there is an even
chance or better that collective bargaining will be widely adopted as a
method of determining faculty salaries and conditions of employment;
56 percent considered collective bargaining undesirable or detrimental. 47
In a more recent survey of 60,447 faculty members across the country,
the following statement was submitted: "Collective bargaining by
faculty members has no place in a college or university." The results
were that 19.1 percent agreed strongly, 23.5 percent agreed with reserdisagreed
vation, 33.7 percent disagreed with reservation, 20.4 percent
48
strongly-thus, 54.1 percent disagreed with this statement.
Whichever alternative a faculty may choose, a faculty senate, a union,
or a combination of the two, debate among faculty members will be
45. A decision from the state labor board was expected by late fall, 1970. Id. At the
University of Wisconsin, the teaching assistants elected the Teaching Assistant Associa-

tion as their bargaining agent. After a one month strike over the issue of how much
decision-making power teaching assistants could have over educational issues, an
agreement was negotiated in April, 1970. See THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION 3
(March 30, 1970).
46. THE CHRONIcLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION 6 (May 25, 1970).
47. THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION 6 (October 28, 1968); see also AMasuc,
COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, THE FUTURE AcADEMIC COMMUNTY: CoNnIUrrY AND CHANCE 140

(1968) where a poll of college administrators showed 40 percent expecting collective bargaining to become commonplace, with 90 percent stating they did not like the prospect.
48. THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (April 6, 1970).
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lively and unpredictable. There are, however, recurring arguments
raised at any debate by proponents and opponents of unionism regarding
its appropriateness as a means of faculty governance. Some of the more
common arguments relate to a college professor's concern about professional status: (a) would acceptance of the employee status cause
damage to his professional status? (b) would his academic freedom
and freedom of choice be diminished? (c) would the industrial relations
model with its strike weapon be appropriate as a method for academic
governance? Since these are the issues over which professors debate
when deciding whether or not to form a union, it would be useful to
analyze them more closely.

B. The Professor and Issues Regarding Collective Bargaining
1. The Professoras a Professional
(a) A Commnmity of Scholars?
The above questions are inextricably tied to the notion of professionalism and the image it generates in the mind of the university community.49 That community, ideally, is an educational "community of
scholars" devoted to the pursuit and communication of knowledge
through research and teaching. Opponents of unionism in higher education attempt to justify their opposition by claiming that collective bargaining is inappropriate for the college professor because he is a scholar
and thereby able to order his own affairs." This view is shared by many
present day academics who cherish the university as a community of
scholars. 51 As a former chancellor of Berkeley stated:
Our university house has many mansions. Though the dwellers
therein speak in tongues of their specializations, they belong to a
single community of scholarly endeavor. Whatever impedes, adulterates, or thwarts that endeavor is a menace to the mission of the
52
community.
Others, recognizing the merits of the ideal, see the community of scholars concept as an "earnest, anachronistic appeal for return to a time that
49. See generally Rehmus, supranote 12, at 9.
50. Hamilton, Will the College Teacher Organize?, 1962 INDus. UNION DEPT. DiG. 128.
51. See generally Lunsford, Who Are Members of the University Conmunity?,
45 DENVER L. J. 545 (1968); 'Representation of Economic Interests, 52 AAUP BULL.
229, 233 (1966).
52. Strong, Shared Responsibility, 49 AAUP BuLL. 109, 113 (1963).
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never was, when all interests among students, faculty, and the society
could be reconciled without covert or open conffict." 53 To which
view a particular faculty member subscribes depends upon his personal
beliefs concerning the nature of professionalism and his own role within
that concept.

(b) Professionalism
Professionalism has been defined as allegiance to a particular set of
beliefs, ideas, and convictions concerning the conditions under which
one's work is or should be performed. This set of ideas centers
principally upon three concepts, "that of specialized expertise, of autonomy, and of service." 54 Autonomy carries with it the emphasis that the
professional himself must have final responsibility, albeit with the advice
and consultation of his colleagues, to determine how his work is to be
done, how and what problems should be dealt with, what values should
be sought, and what the criteria for distinction are. 55
Justice Brandeis in defining and distinguishing professions from occupations, noted three prevalent characteristics:
First: A profession is an occupation for which the necessary and
preliminary training is intellectual in character, involving knowledge and to some extent learning as distinguished from mere skill.
Second: It is an occupation which is pursued largely for others and
not merely for one's self.
Third: It is an occupation in which the amount of financial return
is not the accepted measure of success. 56
Although this definition was written in 1912, it may still be accurate,
especially with regard to the third point. Studies have indicated that
economic aspects of teaching have often been secondary to other considerations such as class size and participation in campus government in
recent expressions of faculty unrest.57 This is not to suggest that salaries
53. Lunsford, supra note 51, at 546.
54. Kadish, The Strike and the Professoriate,54 AAUP BULL. 160, 161 (1968).
55. Id.
56. Miller, The Personnel Dilemma: Profession or Not?, 38 PERSONNEL J.
1959), Cornell University, Reprint Series No. 84 (1959). Miller adds
"decisive feature distinguishing professional from other activities is this: that
occupy a peculiar position of trust toward the public and to a special
(students)." Id. at 54.
57. TAsK FoRcE REPORT, supra note 4, at 13.

53 (June
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are not foremost in professors' assessments of their positions; rather it
indicates a feeling of equal or paramount interest in educational and selfgovernment matters.
Some feel that present systems of self-government do not recognize
professionalism in its full sense.
[Teachers] are the victims of a kind of one-dimensional professionalism: professional responsibility without professional authority. It is as if one were to say to a doctor: "The health of the
patient is in your hands but someone else will make the diagnosis
and prescribe the therapy." 58
That argument continues that to achieve true professionalism and its
recognition by college administrators, organization and militancy are
needed."9

(c) Professionalism Versus Employee Status
Faculty members raise the question of whether acceptance of employee status derived from designation of a collective bargaining agent
will reduce their professional status. Put another way, is the designation
of a professor as an employee an improper selection of a single aspect of
his status and an exclusion of others, or is it a reasonable and realistic
appraisal of his relationship with the administration for most purposes?
Unions traditionally emphasize the latter. It has been stated that "...
the typical union official sees only a terminology difference between the
college teacher and the industrial worker." 60 Even opponents of unionism admit that ". . . university professors are employees by definition...
unlike proto-typical professionals-lawyers and doctors [who are] freelance and totally independent in their relationships with those they
serve." 61 It is argued, however, that this does not preclude realization
of the professional ideals of autonomy and service which comparatively
constitute so much more of the attributes of the university professor.
To represent only the "employee's" interests would be to overlook
these other attributes.
58. Wollett, The Coming Revolution in Public School Management, 67 MicH. L. R~v.
1017, 1020 (1969).

59. R. DoHERTy
A

& W. OBERER, TEACHERS, SCHOOL BOARDS AND CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING:

CHANGING OF THE GUARD

122 (1967); see generally Rehmus, supra note 12, at 9.

60. Brown, supra note 27, at 168.
61. Kadish, supra note 54, at 162.
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2. Effect of Collective Bargainingon Academic Freedom and Professional Autonomy
Many professors are of the opinion that the "primary right and responsibility of the academic man is always to cherish academic freedom." 02
Traditionally, college and university faculties, under the principles of
academic freedom and professional autonomy, have sought to attain
a high degree of professional self-government whereby they can control
or strongly influence "the education and certification of entrants to the
profession; the selection, retention and promotion of their members;
the content of the curriculum; work schedules; and the evaluation of
performance." 63 Professors have also sought a system of faculty governance designed to enhance professional autonomy to the extent necessary to encourage the maximum intellectual productivity. Historically,
academic freedom has not been intended as a shibboleth to protect the
eccentric or the unorthodox, but rather as a requirement for high level
intellectual performance, protecting the academic from excessive judgments on the efficacy of teaching methods and content, by those within
and without the profession.
It is frequently argued that collective bargaining infringes upon the
concept of academic freedom and personal choice and could lead to
uniformity.
Collective bargaining inherently subjects many policy determinations to the rule of the organizational majority, and the majority
rule often reflects deep suspicion of individual initiative or advantage. Thus collective negotiations could have an adverse effect
on teachers with special ability.6
To union opponents the prospect of designation of a bargaining agent
would necessitate weighing the possible imposition of such industrial
practices as job descriptions, which arguably limit and depreciate professional norms and prerogatives, against the concomitant increases in
equality and fairness, if all would share more equally in work distribution and remuneration under union organization.
62. Brown, Rights and Responsibilities of Faculty, 52 AAUP BULL 131 (1966).
63. Garbarino, Professional Negotiations in Education, 7 INDus. RL. 93 (1968).
64. Wollett, supra note 58, at 1029. The author points out that faculty resistance to
change often exists in a non-union setting.
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3. The Appropriateness of the IndustrialRelations Model for Faculty
Governance
The basic question, underlying and including the correlative issues
raised above, is whether the industrial relations model is appropriate as
a method for academic governance. The question of appropriateness
relates closely to how faculty members view their relationship with the
college or university administration. The Task Force Report on faculty
goverance suggested that "relationships between the faculty and academic administrators should be, to the greatest feasible extent, collegial
rather than hierarchial." "1 This envisions a system of faculty government based on shared responsibility and authority, where built-in hierarchial conflicts are at a minimum. If, however, a faculty views its role
with the administration as superordinate and subordinate, instead of
collegial, then acceptance of an industrial relations approach to faculty
goverance would be more predictable. 6
Critics of the industrial relations approach to faculty governance argue
that it artificially and inappropriately creates an adversary relationship
between the administration and the faculty and encourages and maintains a permanent conflict between the two, requiring confrontation,
collective bargaining and coercive sanctions.67 The Task Force on
Faculty Governance has taken a position that collective bargaining
principles in faculty governance are inappropriate. It stated that it
is important that the governance of an academic institution should "not
be viewed as a competitive process in which the augmentation of the
influence of one party automatically diminishes the influences of other
parties." 68 Through cooperation, it is proposed, both parties may be
able to achieve their goals more fully than would be possible through
antagonistic competition.
Proponents of the industrial relations model emphasize that differences will inevitably arise between faculty and administration, and a
unified effort is needed to influence and pressure administrators to the
union's preferred policy.
65. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 25.
66. Williams, An Academic Alternative to Collective Negotiation, 49 PHi DELTA
KA1PAN 571, 573 (1968). The author suggests that subscribers to this view can only
hope to influence the relationship rather than effect changes in the institution's system
of faculty governance. See also Wildman, What Prompts Greater Teacher Militancy?,
AM. SCHOOL BD. J. 29 (March 1967).
67. Williams, supra note 66, at 572. See also McConnell, Faculty Interests in Value
Changes and Power Conflicts, 55 AAUP BuLL. 340, 350 (1969).
68. TASK FORc E REPORT, supra note 4, at 24.
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The American Federation of Teachers has taken the position that
collective bargaining provides conditions of equality between the administrators and the teaching staff "and the cant and hypocrisy of all
sorts of advisory . . . committees, senates and councils are swept away
and real negotiations can take place." '9
The meaning of "real negotiations" may be open to different interpretations and create an issue in itself. For example, former President of
the University of Michigan, Harlan Hatcher, in a speech depicting
possible implications of bargaining by the university staff, stated in
colorful terms that bargaining is a tricky word connoting "haggle"
and "wrangle" which meaning slides into "noisy quarrel" with synonyms of "bickering, controversy, and brawl." 10 He added:
What began as presumptive bargaining in good faith results all too
often in outright economic warfare, calling upon tribal rituals, an
archaic script for the actors, irrational round-the-clock sessions to
reach a settlement to meet an artificial deadline and collective
bludgeoning, in a heated-up mood of strife, with the slogan of get
all you can and everybody else be damned.71
Another issue raised under the question of appropriateness, which is
at the very heart of the controversy, is whether private sector concepts
should be or would be infused into the public sector, and therefore into
the university, by a faculty which unionizes. Typically, state labor
legislation distinguishes only between private sector employees and public sector employees, not singling out teachers or professors by special
legislation. 72 This type of legislation, it is argued, "cannot help but
reflect the interest of the largest classifications of covered employees,
which happens to be blue-collar or sub-professional employees." 73
Professional associations such as the National Education Association
maintain that lumping together all public employees dilutes the concept
of professionalism; 74 whereas, the more militant American Federation
69. McConnell, supra note 67, at 350 (emphasis added).
70. Address by Hatcher, Alexander F. Morrison Lecture, Sept. 22, 1966 (unpublished). See also Walter, An Alternative to Collective Bargaining, 155 Am.ScHoo0L
BD.J. 26, 27 (1968).
71. Hatcher, supra note 70.
72. For a summary of state legislation see Ferguson, supra note 13, at 784-91.
73. Doherty, The Law and Collective BargainingFor Teacbers, 68 TE.Acnaas Cou.aLE
REcoRD No. 1 at 20 (1966).

74. Doherty, supranote 59, at 57.
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of Teachers is less concerned, because it sees no basis for the dichotomy.7' The effect of such legislation is that labor law concepts developed through cases involving non-academic employees will be applied
equally to academic employees. Some faculties view this as inappropriate.
Often, public employee legislation, under which unionized faculties
would operate, is administered by the same agency which administers
private sector labor legislation. This creates greater potential for the
adoption and fusing of common labor law concepts. Opponents of faculty unionism argue that the collective bargaining concept as adopted
from the industrial and commercial world is too limited and rigid and,
in a real sense, runs the danger of dividing the academic community
artificially and unnecessarily into bargaining components, and it is therefore inappropriate. 6 In that regard, New York has recently established
a separate agency for administering public employee law. Professor
Russell Smith of the University of Michigan noted that the implied
rationale underlying the establishment of New York's separate agency
was that:
...novel approaches may be required to deal with the unique
problems of unionism in the public sector, the necessary expertise
should be permitted to develop unhampered
by any preconcep77
tions.. . of private sector legislation.
New York, however, is in the minority by establishing a separate
agency. 78 Since most state laws are modeled upon the arrangements
prevailing in industry, although colleges and universities have traditionally developed very different arrangements for faculty representation,
it would appear that unionized faculties will incorporate private labor
legislation concepts regardless of whether it is viewed as appropriate.
Another facet of the question of appropriateness deals with the issue
of whether bargaining agents would be qualified to bargain on issues
related to educational subjects like curriculum, tenure and selection of
chairmen (assuming such subjects were deemed to be within the legal
scope of bargaining). Union proponents argue that the representatives
75. Id.
76. See generally Brown, supra note 27, at 171. See also Davis, Unions and Higher
Education: Another View, 54 AALUP BULL 317, 320 (1968).
77. Smith, State and Local Advisory Reports on Public Employment Labor Legislation: A Comparative Analysis, 67 MIcH. L. REv. 891, 899 (1969).
78. Id.
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with the aid of faculty committees would be qualified. Opponents argue
that faculty, rather than outsiders, should bear the main responsibility
for determining their own standards of performance because laymen
would be hard pressed to distinguish good from bad practice. As one
opponent stated:
For others to direct.. . what or how to study and teach risks not
only the misjudgment of the unqualified, but the distortion of those
with special interests, whether they be administrative convenience, prejudice or social acceptability-interests to which the pursuit of knowledge is particularly and acutely vulnerable. 7°
Some faculty members deem unionization in colleges as inappropriate
because they foresee an elaborate network of rules and regulations accompanying the union. One author was moved to write:
Grievance procedures, impasse systems, and job descriptions are
carefully defined and meticulously maintained. One cannot help
but wonder if teachers are not ultimately substituting teacherimposed rules and regulations for those formerly imposed by
school management.80
A final argument dealing with the appropriateness of union representation of faculties centers on the extent of reliance by a union on the
strike weapon. Opponents of unionism argue that collective bargaining
and the threat of a strike undermine professorial claims of professional
commitment and commercialize its endeavors.
The move from academic senates to collective bargaining backed
by the strike is a move to the market place, and the spirit of the
market place is that you are entitled to what you can exact, and
what you can exact is what you're entitled to ....
Exaggerated
claims and over-stated positions become the currency of compromise. 81
Supporters of collective bargaining by academic faculties contend that
perhaps militancy is the only way to achieve the idealistic goal of professional status. As one observer stated:
79. Kadish, supra note 54, at 162.
80. Williams, supra note 66, at 572.
81. Kadish, supra note 54, at 164.
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Ironically, they may achieve this status by first learning how to act
like militant trade unionists, thus securing the economic base that
82
will allow them to concentrate on professional problems.
The wisdom of these views must be evaluated at each institution choosing between existing structures of faculty governance such as the traditional model of an academic senate, or a different means such as collective bargaining. It has been suggested, however, that neither model will
persist, but rather a hybrid will develop.
...[O]rganization of professional employees-both those which
call themselves unions and those which do not-will increasingly
take their rhetoric from the... professional model [as exemplified
by doctors and lawyers], their goals and status aspirations from the
academic model, and their tactics from the union model. In brief,
they will do their best to look and sound like professional societies
83
but, if necessary, will act more like unions.
With this admonition in mind, an analysis is made of specific alternative
systems of government available to university faculties, including a
faculty senate and a collective bargaining agent.
IIl.

ALTERNATIVE ORGANIZATIONS FOR FACULTY GOVERNANCE AND
METHODS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

A. Roles of Faculty and Administration
Fundamental to any effective system of faculty governance is proper
allocation of authority between faculty and administration.8 Ideally, the
system will permit those most qualified to make decisions in their area
of competence. There are several possible authority relationships between the faculty and the administration ranging from dominance by
the administration to dominance by the faculty. The Task Force Report
recommended that a middle approach of "shared authority" be used
wherein both faculty and administration exercise effective influence over
decision-making in their respective areas of concern.s"
82. R. Doi-mr & W. Ou3mE, supranote 59, at 125.
83. Garbarino, supranote 63, at 93.

84. See generally Williams, supra note 66 for a comparison of the "industrial relations
approach" with the "academic alternative" as regards the distribution, of authority.
85. The TAsK FORcE REPORT indicated that 25 percent of the institutions it studied
were characterized by administrative dominance, mostly in the junior colleges, 50
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Traditionally, there are certain areas of a university's operations
which are of primary concern to either the administration or the faculty.
Certainly, there is no blanket formula for the role of administrators in
the governance of an institution. There are, however, certain areas
in which they are expected to exercise authority because of legislative
direction or because the situation is within their special competence.
The Task Force Report identified six areas in which administrators
have special competence: (1) over-all leadership; (2) coordination of
the activities of the competent parts of the institution; (3) planning and
innovation; (4) maintaining quality standards of the institution; (5)
acting as a buffer between the board of trustees and faculty; and (6)
business management.8 6 Obviously, administration officials need not
have, nor do they necessarily desire, unilateral control over the implementation of all of these operations. There are many areas where faculty
members should be consulted, and are consulted, so that they may contribute to the input portion of the decision-making process and bring
their special knowledge and points of view to bear on the problem
under consideration. Most of these areas, however, require final decision
by an administrator with a general overview of the needs of the entire
university community. This approach will minimize the possibility of
decisions based on self-interest.
The professor is interested in the quality of his institution because it is
a direct reflection of his academic abilities. Therefore, his role will involve participating in and attempting to control the decisions which
affect the "product" of his institution and his status as a professional.
Questions of educational policy and administration such as curriculum,
degree requirements, scholastic standards, evaluation of performance,
and academic freedom would necessarily be within these categories since
they are central to the educational program and define the professional
role of the faculty member.
A primary goal in establishing the relative roles of administration and
faculty should be the creation of an effective system of faculty governance by procedures and divisions of authority which will promote the
most constructive exercise of the powers and abilities of each party. In
systems of internal representation, such as by a faculty senate, designation of the traditional areas of authority according to whether they are
percent were characterized by administrative primacy and 25 percent by shared
authority. TAsK FoRcz REPORT, supra note 4, at 16-17.
86. Id. at 18-19.
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academic or non-academic is of less concern than if an external system
of representation exists, such as a collective bargaining agent. While in
both systems it is possible that academic and non-academic matters
would be discussed, it is more likely that only non-academic matters
would be within the university's acceptable scope of subjects for collective bargaining. The academic matters would then be decided by the
administration or by an internal representative or a combination thereof,
depending on the particular institution.
B. OrganizationalForms for Faculty Representation
Professors in higher education have traditionally aspired to some
degree of self-government both as a means to protect themselves from
arbitrary actions by superiors and to enable them to participate in and
formulate policies affecting themselves and the university community.
At stake are issues concerning vital interests of the faculty member,
including performance ratings, promotions, tenure, and other matters
relating to his future marketability as a professor. Which organizational.
form of self-government evolves at a particular institution depends on
established traditions, the activities of professional organizations, and
in some cases statutory enactments. In choosing among the alternatives,
it is important that a faculty member have the right to choose the type
of faculty representative he deems fit. It is also important that some
type of formal arrangement be established through which faculty influence may be exercised.
The general forms of organizations for faculty governance may be
identified as: (1) internal representative bodies; (2) external representative bodies, either (a) professional associations or (b) collective
bargaining agents.8 7 These forms of organizations can be distinguished
by their relationship to the formal administration of the institution, their
objectives, and their tactics, although particular organizations like professional associations may assume the role of either form of the external
representative body. Additionally, it should be noted that these alternative forms are not mutually exclusive, and there may be combinations
of them at any particular institution. The right of faculty members, as
public employees, to organize and choose a collective bargaining agent
87. Id. at 33. For characteristics of each model, see Rehmus, supra note 12, at 7-9.
For discussion of a European historical basis favoring the "academic model," see
Williams, supra note 66, at 572.
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from among these organizations, is now recognized in almost every
state.""

1. Internal RepresentativeBodies
Traditionally, the most common vehicle for faculty participation in
campus governance has been an internal faculty agency, characterized
by its integration into the institutional structure.
There are two general types of internal organizations, an academic
senate and a committee system. The committee system, best suited for
smaller colleges with a homogeneous faculty, has either one large committee or several standing committees which serves as a channel of
communication between the faculty and administration. Members of
the committees may be elected by the faculty or appointed by the administration. The committees usually are without much power and serve
mainly as fact-finders and advisors.8 9
The academic senate, on the other hand, is usually more dynamic and
representative. At many institutions it is composed of all eligible faculty
members (a majority of the institutions require a rank above instructor
for eligibility) who then elect a smaller council or assembly to transact
the actual business. The more common forms of senates are the academic
senate, representing all faculty with academic rank, and the faculty senate, representing the teaching faculty. Either form may include or
exclude administrators; however, the former "mixed senate" is more
common.
Some opponents of the senate system say it can easily become undemocratic by excluding "members of the other 'party' " from powerful
committees and stacking other committees with members of the faction
88. See Ferguson, supra note 13, at 786-89. The lone exceptions appear to be
Alabama where it has been held that state public policy restricts union organization
of state employees until legislative authorization is obtained. Int'l Union of Op. Eng'rs v.
Water Works Bd. of City of Birmingham, 276 Ala. 462, 163 So. 2d 619 (1964). More
recently in Iowa bargaining rights have been limited by the state supreme court holding
that, in the absence of legislation to the contrary, the coercive strike remains illegal and
the University of Northern Iowa, a state institution, through its board of regents can
engage in collective bargaining to the extent of conferring about wages, working
conditions and grievances, but cannot grant exclusive bargaining rights to any group
of employees. State Bd. of Regents v. United Packing House Workers, Local 1258,
- Iowa -, 175 N.W.2d 110, 113 (1970) (involving non-academic employees). The court
concluded ". . . if the legislature desires to give public employees the advantages of
collective bargaining in the full sense as that term is used in private industry, it
should do so by specific legislation."
89. TAsK FORcE Rzoir, supra note 4, at 34.
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in power 0 Supporters acknowledge this possibility, but point out that
"where there is a strong faculty senate, democratically elected and
functioning as a meaningful partner in the educational enterprise, there
is little need for collective bargaining." 91
2. External Representative Bodies
(a) ProfessionalAssociations
By definition these organizations fall outside the institutional framework of formal campus government. Traditionally, they have concerned
themselves with improving the professional status of the faculty by
promoting and maintaining broad professional standards and practices
to be observed by administrations and faculties alike. Occasionally, in
cases involving egregious treatment of faculty members and violations
of standards, they will act as pressure groups vis-a-vis the administration.
In addition to these functions, they regularly publish periodicals, some
containing salary schedules of other colleges and universities and material of general assistance to a faculty member in his professional role.
Most often they function in conjunction with a faculty senate, providing information and assistance where needed and otherwise supplementing the senate's functions. However, in recent years some of the associations have expressed increased interest in serving as full-time faculty
representatives, and increasing their role from influencing the decisionmaking process to participating in it.
The most active national associations for faculty members have been
the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), the National Education Association (NTEA), and the American Association
for Higher Education (AAHE), which has an affiliation with the NEA.
The respective philosophies of these associations (AAHE and NEA are
treated as one) will be dealt with in subsequent sections.
(b)

Collective Bargaining Agents

The other type of external representative is the collective bargaining
agent. Primarily centered in junior colleges, bargaining agents are relatively rare for faculties of four-year colleges and universities. Evidence
is mounting, however, that collective bargaining is becoming increas90. McConnell, supra note 67, at 349.
91. Brown, supranote 27, at 181.
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ingly attractive to some university faculties. 2 Most of the special legal
obstacles regarding the right of unions and associations to bargain with
public institutions, where faculty members are also public employees,
have been removed by legislation.93 Like the external professional associations, the bargaining agency seeks to directly participate in the decision-making process rather than merely to influence it. Often the
bargaining agent's efforts culminate in a written agreement. The essential
element of this model of faculty governance is the belief that a fundamental and permanent conflict of interest exists between faculty and
administration. 94 Also, in the union's attempt to secure better economic
benefits and conditions of employment, elements of the faculty member's employee status are emphasized rather than those of his professional status. Unions (e.g., AFT) and professional associations (e.g.,
NEA and AAUP) alike, have acted as formal bargaining agents.

3. Views on Appropriate Organizationsfor Faculty Governance
(a) American Association of University Professors (AAUP)
It has been said of the philosophy of the AAUP that
few AAUP members look upon the AALUP itself as an instrument of self-government. Instead, they think of the AAUP as a
means by which they can get self-government at each individual campus. The AAUP to date is primarily an interest group. 95
...

This association was founded in 1915 as an organization designed "to
protect the academic freedom of individuals and to develop the occupation of college teaching into a profession closely modeled on medicine
and law." " Since 1955, it has maintained programs aimed at improving salaries and strengthening job security, including the publication of
yearly surveys of university and college minimum and average earnings
for each rank of professor. Based on this information, each institution
92. See text accompanying notes 28-45 supra.
93. The exception of Alabama and the special limitations in Iowa are discussed in
note 88 supra.
94. See generally Brown, supra note 27, at 168; Relimus, supra note 12, at 8-9.
95. Brown, supra note 27, at 173. It was also noted that about 30 percent of the
professors eligible for AAUP membership are members. This totals approximately
90,000 members in 1150 chapters. See Brown, supra note 18, at 1070 n. 11.
96. Metzger, Origins of the Association, 51 AAUP BuLm. 229, 232, 233 (1965). It
should be stated that the AAUP has achieved notable success in protecting faculty
members in the area of academic freedom.

280

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:252

is graded from AA to F in terms of the AAUP's previously announced
standards.
In recent years, a debate has developed between two factions of the
AAUP. There are those who wish it to continue as primarily a professional organization, and others who wish it to be a militant organizadon working for economic objectives27 It would seem that the recent
AAUP objectives reflect a compromise between the two positions. In
1968, in an official policy statement, the AAUP stated as its current
objectives: the promotion of "economic and other interests of the
faculty, . . . full participation by all faculty members, [guarantee]
of academic freedom and tenure, [creation of grievance procedures,
and non-support of a] strike or other work stoppage, except in extraordinary circumstances." 9s
To accomplish these objectives the AAUP has traditionally favored
the faculty senate form of governance, viewing the industrial relations
approach as inappropriate.
Faculty members, in decisions relating to the protection of their...
interests should participate through structures of self-government
within the institution, with the faculty participating either directly or through faculty-elected councils or senates. As integral
parts of the institutions such councils or senates can effectively
represent the faculty without taking on the adversary and sometimes arbitrary attitude of an outside representative. 99
However, the association has clearly stated that when a faculty is considering representation through an outside organization the AAUP
chapter may compete with it to represent that faculty.' It is submitted
that this statement is the AAUP's public announcement that it will soon
be competing with the NEA and AFT.
97. The groups favoring strictly professional objectives are said to be from "older
better established institutions . .. [which] are generally well off;" whereas, the more
militant faction are said to be from newer institutions of lesser renown. See Brown,
supra note 27, at 171.
98. Policy on Representation of Economic Interests, 54 AAUP BULL.

152, 154

(1968) (emphasis added). "Extraordinary circumstances" are defined as flagrant violations of academic freedom or government. Proposed Statement on Strikes, id. at 157.
99. Policy on Representation of Economic Interests, supra note 98, at 152-53.
100. Id. A local chapter of the AAUP had evidentally anticipated this "go ahead,"
because a year earlier it had become the recognized bargaining agent for the faculty
at Junior College District No. 522, Bellville, Illinois. Ferguson, supra note 13, at 801.
For other colleges where the AAUP has been designated as a collective bargaining
agent, see note 32 supra.
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(b) NationalEducation Association (NEA) 10 1
The NEA was founded in 1957 to "elevate the character and advance
the interests of the profession of teaching, and . . .promote the cause
of popular education in the United States." 102 Toward that end, it has
traditionally represented elementary and secondary school teachers,
and administrators. In 1968, it claimed a membership of nearly fifty-two
percent of the teachers, or over one million persons, with an additional
600,000 teachers and administrators affiliated with state associations. 0 3
By that same year, it also claimed to represent eight junior college facul04
ties, having negotiated written agreements with three of them.
It is interesting to note the increasing militancy of the NEA's policies
regarding its role in the relationship of faculties to school administrations.'"° Prior to 1960, the NEA had made no mention of bargaining,
sanctions, or strikes. In that year, however, the NEA's board of directors adopted a resolution on representative negotiations suggesting that
affiliate chapters could properly discuss conditions of employment with
the school administration. 10 6 In 1961, the NEA stated that professional
education associations should participate with school boards in determining "policies of common concern, including salary...." 107 The year
1962 represented a turning point for the NEA. It resolved to support
professional negotiations and to insist upon the right of professional
associations to participate in determining policies and to join in establish101. The NEA has various affiliates throughout the nation. Affiliates of the NEA
in Michigan and their members are as follows: The Michigan Association for Higher
Education (MAHE) is an association of persons who are faculty members on community college and four-year college and university campuses and in graduate and
professional schools in Michigan. It is a department of the Michigan Education
Association, a statewide association of more than 70,000 members in elementary,
secondary, and higher education. MAHE is affiliated with the American Association
for Higher Education (AAHE), a nationwide organization of faculty members in
higher education. AAHE is a department of the million member National Education
Association, a nationwide association of persons in elementary, secondary and higher
education. See Serving Higher Education Faculties, MIcH. EDuc. J. 21 (October, 1967).
This information is also based on an interview with Charles Belknap, supra note 14.
102. E. WESLEY, Tim NEA: Tm FiRST HuNRiR YEARS 1 (1957).
103. NEA Assembly, Press Release, July, 1968; see also Glass, Work Stoppages and
Teachers: History and Prospect, 90 MoNTHLY LAB. REV. 43 (Aug. 1967).
104. Ferguson, supra note 13, at 800.
105. For a detailed analysis of the evolution of the NEA's policies see Muir, supra
note 7.
106. NATIONAL EDUCATION AssociATION, ADDRESSES AND PRoCEEDINGS 154 (1960).
107. NATIONAL EDUCATION AssocIATIoN, ADDRESSES AND PRocEEINGs 216 (1961).
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ing procedures to "reach mutually satisfactory agreements." 108 It stated
that
It] he teacher's situation is completely unlike that of an industrial
employee... . Industrial disputes conciliation machinery, which
assumes a conflict of interest and a diversity of purpose between
persons and groups, is not appropriate to professional negotiations
in education. 10 9
It also asserted, however, that professional sanctions should be invoked
as a means to prevent arbitrary policies or practices by administrations.'"
In 1963, NEA added that negotiation procedures must be established,
and in 1964 it agreed that NEA affiliates could use machinery, such as
state mediation and arbitration boards, originally designed for settling
industrial disputes."'
It should be noted that in 1964 the AFT was very active in recruiting
new members, which caused great concern within the NEA and stimulated its changing attitude toward collective bargaining. In 1965, it
was resolved that members who ignored Association-imposed sanctions
were subject to expulsion;" 2 and, in 1966, the Assembly sought the
establishment of professional grievance procedures. 31 In 1967, the
NEA's board of directors, although not endorsing strike action, agreed
to support affiliates once a strike had occurred." 4 The Assembly endorsed
this policy the following year and called upon its affiliates to seek the
repeal of state laws that prohibited the withdrawal of services." 5 This
area contains a basic difference of philosophy between the NEA and the
AFT."" The NEA opposes any statutory scheme which may tend to
cause loss of the teaching profession's identity as a profession. The AFT,
108.

NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, ADDRESSES AND PROCEEDINGS 174-75

(1962).

109. Id. at 398.

110. Id.
111. NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, ADDRESSES AND PROCEEDINGS 237
NATIONAL EDUCATION AssocATIoN, ADDRESSES AND PROCEEDINGS 22 (1964).
112. NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, ADDRESSES AND PROCEEDINGS 223 (1965).
113. NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, ADDRESSES AND PROCEEDINGS 473 (1966).

(1963);

114. Resolution on Impasse in Negotiation Situation-Passed by NEA Board of
Directors,July 1, 1967, NEA J. 38 (October 1967).
115. NEA RESOLmUONS CoMmirLEE, REPORT ON THE PLATFORM AND RESOLUTIONS 15
What the Association may have in mind for the future can be anticipated
(1968).
by its president's request in 1968 for a $10 per year increase in membership fees to be
earmarked for the establishment of a defense fund. Muir, supra note 7, at 624.
116. For a general discussion of NEA and AFT views, see R. DoHERTY & W. OBERER,
supra note 59, at 22-44; M. MosKow, TEAcrmEs AND UNIONS 93-114 (1966).
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on the other hand, holds that there is no reason for distinguishing
teachers from other public employees because teachers, unlike lawyers
or doctors, perform their professional functions almost solely as employees.- 7 Although this metamorphosis of the NEA's position related
primarily to the secondary and elementary situation, the applicability
to higher education is evident. It therefore appears that the NEA has
joined those who favor collective bargaining as the most appropriate
form for faculty governance. If the AFT has persuaded the NEA to
change its position on bargaining, sanctions, and strikes, and caused it
to seek protective legislation and exclusive bargaining rights, then the
observation that union rivalry is one of the important "sources of vitality in the American labor movement" would seem correct, and would
8
suggest that such rivalry will continue."

(c)

American Federation of Teachers (AFT)

Organized in 1916, the AFT immediately affiliated with the American
Federation of Labor and has since followed the general pattern of Amer-

ican unionism as embodied in the National Labor Relations Act. "[I]t
asserts that designating an organization independent of the institution

as the exclusive representative of all professional employees of the institution is normal and inevitable. It accepts a management-employee relationship between... administrations ... and faculties.. . ," and through
collective bargaining it expects to achieve uniform conditions of employment, thereby, in its opinion, enhancing the prospect of increased salaries
and decreased work loads.-"9 Dr. Israel Kugler, as President of the United
Federation of College Teachers (an affiliate of AFT), explained the
union's view of present institutions and their internal systems of faculty
governance.
The board of directors is a board of trustees; the managers are the
presidents and the host of deans. It is these groups that wield the
power and authority and determine the destiny of a university.
To be sure, they have woven a web of faculty senates and councils
which simulate the original role of policy-making that university
faculties once had. The advisory nature of these bodies provides
them with some active role in curriculum and student affairs, but
117. Brown, supra note 27, at 174.
118. See generally G. BROOKS, THE
MoVEMEr (1960).

119. Brown, supra note 18, at 1069.

SOURCES OF VITALITY IN THE AMERICAN LABoR
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virtually no part to play in securing the necessary finances to provide professional salaries, work load, and working conditions. 20
(d) Task Force Report'2 '
This report is comprehensive in its treatment of the alternative methods of faculty governance used throughout the nation's campuses, and it
is therefore important to note its analyses. In 1966, the Task Force was
convened to "examine factors contributing to faculty unrest and recommend procedures for improving faculty participation in campus
government." '" The report was based on intensive field investigations
wherein thirty-four separate institutions in different parts of the country
were visited, including twenty-eight public and six private colleges and
universities. The public institutions included twelve junior or community colleges, seven municipal or state colleges, seven institutions that
recently had attained university status, and two long-established universities.1
The main source of faculty discontent was found to be the desire
of faculty members to participate more fully in the determination of
policies affecting their status and performance.' 24 It added that shared
authority was the desired concept for an effective system of campus
governance and was best implemented through the establishment of
an internal organization, preferably an academic senate composed of
faculty and administrative personnel, rather than by the utilization of
external agencies such as professional associations or bargaining agencies. 12 5 It viewed external professional associations as possibly constructive complements to the academic senate, in that they could provide
120. Kugler, supra note 69, at 350. For a detailed and authoritative summary of
AFT positions in higher education, see Kugler, The Union Speaks for Itself, 49 EDUC.
REC. 414 (1968).
121. Although the AAHE, an affiliate of NEA, funded this report, the authors, all
professors, state that their work "was carried out without any preconditions or biases
other than those imposed by the members of the Task Force . . . and this report
presents the judgments of the Task Force alone and not of the sponsoring agency."
TAsK FoRcE REPORT, supra note 4, at v.
122. Id. at 6.
123. Id. The institutions studied in Michigan were the University of Michigan,
Central Michigan University, Wayne State University, Michigan State University
and Henry Ford Community College. Based upon an interview with one of the
authors of the Task Force Report, Professor Charles Rehmus, Co-Director of the
Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations at the University of Michigan.
124. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 1.
125. Id. at 2.
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information and technical services to the faculty and support educational
sanctions should they become necessary."a On the issue of strikes the
report stated: "Although strikes are generally undesirable in institutions
of higher education, under certain circumstances they may be a less
destructive alternative than other sanctions." 127
4. Professional Associations and Collective Bargaining Agencies Compared
(a) General Comparison
Naturally, a professional association by not seeking to bargain collectively for a faculty can maintain that descriptive status. The question
has arisen in recent years whether these associations have been desirous
of retaining that status or, whether they have been seeking (or are likely
to seek in the future) to bargain collectively for faculties. If, in fact,
there is no substantive difference in present approaches, then it is submitted that the choice facing faculties is simply between an internal
organization such as a senate or a single type of external organization
following the industrial relations model.us Since the AFT characterizes
itself as a union, the inquiry below mainly concerns the NEA (and its
affiliates)' '2and the AAUP.
The AAUP has been taking an increasingly militant stance in the area
of faculty governance, especially regarding the right of faculty to use
the strike sanction. For the present time at least, it has apparently limited the utilization of a strike to academic rather than economic matters,
and it has carefully couched every militant position in terms of preference
for restraint and exhaustion of internal remedies.30 Additionally, with
a few exceptions, 13' it has not actively sought to represent faculties for
purposes of collective bargaining culminating in written agreements,
although it admittedly stands ready to do S0.112 It is very possible that it
may soon be engaging in these types of activities, but it has not yet
126. The Report added: "a more perceptive view of the emergence of bargaining
agencies on the campus is that they provide dramatic evidence of the institution's failure
to develop satisfactory alternatives for faculty representation." Id. at 44-45.
127. Id. at 4.
128. This assumes that a faculty senate does not attempt to qualify as a labor
organization (discussed in a subsequent section).
129. Affiliates of the NEA such as the AAHE are treated as one.
130. See generally ProposedStatement on Strikes, supra note 98, at 157.
131. See notes 37 and 42 supra..
132. Faculty Participationin Strikes, 54 AAUP ButL.. 154 (1968).
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devoted its energies toward that end. That the AAUP, when designated
as a bargaining agent, would not take a trade union approach but would
rather use that position as a means to strengthen internal organizations
is suggested by the following observation.
[A]n administration and a bargaining representative who were of
like minds on principles of shared power could contract, within
the expansive limits of the phrase "terms and conditions of employment," to withdraw all sorts of academic issues from unilateral
control of either administration or bargaining representative, and
to reserve them for prescribed internal procedures with full faculty participation.133
In this way, it is suggested, the ideals of academic government could
become the beneficiaries of collective bargaining agreements which
might otherwise threaten them. Although it is too early to predict which
course the AAUP will take, it is still primarily a professional oganizanon. But, it is certain that the AAUP is watching the organizational
activities of the NEA and AFT as they add to their membership and
obtain exclusive rights of representation.
Questions have also been raised whether the NEA and its affiliates
are more accurately called professional associations or labor organizations. It has been said of the NEA that there is very little difference
34
between it and AFT.
... NEA affiliates are beginning to act very much like trade unions.
Indeed, when an NEA affiliate participates in a representation election, wins the election and assumes the role of exclusive bargaining
agent, enters into negotiations with the employer over a comprehensive agreement, goes out on strike when its terms are not met,
wins the strike and administers the agreement with vigor and determination-when an affiliate does all this, it does not seem right
to speak of it as anything but a union.... The struggle then seems
to have become not a contest between rival ideologies, between
"professionalism" and "trade unionism," but between rival unions,
reminiscent of jurisdictional fights in private employment .... 135
133. Brown, supra note 18, at 1078-79. It should be noted that Professor Brown
stated this position as President of the AAUP.
134. Brown, supranote 27, at 174.
135. R. DoHERrTY & W. OBERER, supranote 59, at 41.
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Another author suggests that "professional associations in the teaching
professions are already unions in all but name; although educational
associations cling desperately to clichs of the past when defining terms
in the delicate area of collective bargaining." '3

(b) Connotative and Legal Comparison
Using Webster's Dictionary to define the terms "professional association," and "trade union," one finds a distinct difference. The question
remains, however, as to the legal difference when placed in the context
37
of a collective bargaining agent.'
State and federal legislation often similarly define "collective bargaining" as
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement,
or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by
either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to
agree to a proposal or make a concession. 13 8
The term "collective bargaining agent" embodies the concept of exclusive representative which in its application precludes an employer from
negotiating with individual employees and, in general, dealing in any
way except through the representative.' 39
Neither the word "professional" nor "union" is used in state legislation; rather the federal definition of the term "labor organization" is fol136. Marmion, supranote 18, at 41.
137. Address by William Lemmer, Attorney for University of Michigan, A Professional Society or a Trade Union as a Collective Bargaining Agent, What's the
Difference?, Feb. 28, 1970 (unpublished).
138. The statute is applicable to public employees. Act 379, [1965], Public Employment Relations Act (PERA), MicH. STAT. AN. § 17.455 (15) (1968) (words "ordinance
or resolution" follow contract). Applicable federal law is found in the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
139. Public Employment Relations Act, MicH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455 (11) (1968), which
provides that individuals may present grievances to the employer for adjustment, if
such adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
and the bargaining representative has been given an opportunity to be present at such
adjustment.
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lowed. 1 0 While Michigan's law governing public employees does not
define labor organization, its administering agency, the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC), in its decisions involving
public employees has uniformly adopted the federal law's definition. By
case interpretation, it has been defined as "an organization existing for
the purpose of organizing employees in anticipation of representing
employees, in which employees participate
. ," 141 and "even though
it may have an informal structure, a committee existing for the purpose of dealing with the employer concerning wages, hours and working conditions is a labor organization." '4 It is apparent that regardless
of the title of the organization, it is still a "labor organization" when it
seeks to engage in collective bargaining.
In summary, regardless which organizational form for faculty governance is selected, freedom of choice in that decision is possible only
by awareness of the alternatives, the views of the various organizations,
and the actual or imagined differences between them. This discussion
has attempted to provide that information.

C. Methods of Dispute Settlement
1. Alternative Approaches of Decision-Making
Disagreements inevitably arise between an administration and its
faculty; how these disagreements are viewed often governs the type of
approach used to resolve the dispute. If a faculty views a dispute as a
problem to be solved within a framework of common goals, an appeal
to reason can be used in the context of institutionally established appeal
or grievance procedures.' 4 ' The potential for confrontation will be
diminished with the emphasis placed on persuasion as a means to achieve
objectives. If, on the other hand, a faculty views a dispute as a conflict,
which assumes the existence of an adversary relationship, then greater
emphasis will be placed on coercion and power as means to elicit favorable responses to demands.
Since collective bargaining is a recent development on college campuses, many of the alternatives discussed below have been formulated for
140. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. A-N.

§ 17.454 (2)

(g) (1968); National Labor Relations

Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1964).
141. Harper Hospital, 1969 MICH. EMPLOYMENT REL. COMM'N LAB. Ops. 243.
142. Wayne State University, 1969 MICH. EMPLOYMENT REL. Coa_ 'N LAB. Ops. 670.
143. This envisions a system separate from one which is run entirely by a university
administration.
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public employees generally. There is no reason to believe that college
faculty members will be treated differently from other public employees
in the immediate future; therefore, analogies will be made from current
public employee law concepts. There are three alternative approaches
to decision-making in dispute settlement: (a) persuasion; (b) institutional procedures using neutral third-parties; and (c) coercion, including sanctions and strikes. The first approach is used most often, but
when disputes persist resort must be made to the second approach. If
this alternative is not available, the faculty is faced with the unhappy
choice of subordinating its position to the administration or using the
alternatives suggested in the third approach.
(a) Persuasion (Informal DisputeSettlement)
This is an informal approach involving appeals to reason and the
exchange of information, based on the concept of shared authority
between administration officials and faculty, where each tries to influence
a change in the other's attitude or position. Since professors are the
teachers of reason and logic, it is appropriate, as well as traditional, that
in resolving disputes they employ persuasive techniques appealing to
reason based on the presentation of facts. This approach provides each
side with sufficient facts so that each could contribute to the decision,
even though one party or the other may assume the major burden of
decision-making. With information freely shared at an early stage
in the decision-making process, premature solidification of positions
based on supposition rather than fact can be minimized, if not avoided.
If persuasion cannot prevail, however, resort to alternative approaches
embodying formal arrangements for dispute settlement, may be necessary.
(b) Institutionally Established Procedures Using Neutral Third-Parties
Institutionally established procedures on campuses without collective
bargaining agents may include mediation fact finding, or arbitration as
techniques to avoid or break an impasse. These procedures will commonly be available only to resolve issues which have a special relevance
for individual faculty members, such as promotion and tenure, rather
than be available to the faculty as a whole on issues such as educational
policies. Of course, resolution of issues involving individuals very often
achieves the same result as if an issue affecting the faculty as a whole
had been decided.
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It has been said of grievance procedures in higher education:
This is one of the major contributions of the
movement to working life. It brings important
process into the employment relationship. . . .
however, the keystone of the grievance process
of review of administrative decisions by qualified
neutrals. 44

American union
elements of due
Most important,
is the possibility
and independent

Unfortunately, the keystone of the process, review of administrative
decisions by neutrals, is often not present within a university appeal
procedure except in an advisory function. More often than not, administration officials are unable or do not wish to relinquish their ultimate
decision-making powers to an outsider regardless of his neutrality. 4 5
Part of this hesitancy by university administrations is based on opinions
4 6
that it would constitute an unconstitutional delegation of authority1
and that serious bargaining would be inhibited by knowledge that an
arbitrator would likely make the final decision. Thus, where the administration chooses not to submit a dispute to a neutral third-party,
and where the grievant has exhausted his institutionally established
procedures, the possibility must be recognized that methods of coercion
may be used. These methods include the strike.
If strikes are found to be personally or legally inappropriate in the
academic setting or just not compatible with the desired goal of an
amicable negotiated settlement, then alternatives are needed. There is
some evidence in this country that alternative dispute resolution procedures, including mediation, fact-finding, and arbitration, have been
144. Rehmus, supra note 12, at 12.
145. TASK FOnca REPORT, supra note 4, at 54 reported in its study that several
institutions had formal grievance procedures in operation. None of these procedures
provided for arbitration by an outside third-party, but in one large university, disputes
over individual issues could be referred for final determination to an internal panel
comprised of an equal number of administrators and faculty members. However, in
1968 the Legislative Conference negotiated an agreement with City University of
New York calling for binding arbitration by a neutral third-party.
146. See generally K. DAvis, ADMINIsTrrvE LAw Taz AUsE § 2.10 (1958).

Most

often such a delegation must be authorized by statute where it is not pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement. The statute must have unambiguous standards; see, e.g.,
MicH. Coupt,. LAws ANN. § 423.239 (Supp. 1970); even then there are often statutory
limits to the arbitrator's ability to grant awards. See generally Rehmus, Constraints on
Local Governments in Public Employee Bargaining, 67 MicH. L. REv. 919 (1969);
Comment, Collective Bargaining for Public Employees and the Prevention of Strikes in
the Public Sector, 68 MicH. L. REv. 260, 279-89 (1969).
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sufficient to induce settlements in many situations involving public employees. 14 7 Accordingly, it would be useful to examine these procedures
to the extent that they might be utilized on the college campuses with
or without a collective bargaining agent.

(1) Mediation
Mediation is designed to promote settlements by introducing a third
party into the dispute who acts passively in helping the parties agree on
their own solutions. This could be used as a persuasive technique in
colleges, and could easily be incorporated into an existing grievance
procedure. Professional associations such as the AAUP have rendered
this service on an ad hoe basis, usually in cases involving academic freedom. Some states, like Michigan, make formal mediation services available (including use of general labor mediators) upon request of either
14
party to resolve disputes relating to a collective bargaining agreement. s

(2) Fact-Finding
Fact-finding as a technique is gaining widespread acceptance in public
employee disputes and suggests a very viable possibility for use by faculties in higher education.' 49 After an impasse is reached, this procedure
utilizes a neutral third-party to make a thorough investigation, present
the facts to both sides, and encourage the parties to engage in responsible
scrutiny of their respective positions. Fact-finders may or may not give
recommendations; if they do, and one party refuses to follow them,
then the other party can make the findings public in an attempt to
influence the recalcitrant party. 5 0 In this way, the fact-finder can prevent either party from abusing its bargaining power. The fact-finding
method, however, is somewhat limited, because the entire process is
147. J. BmnLsco, Ptimuc EMPLOYEE DisPUTE SEInEMENT (1966); Stern, Wisconsin
Fact-Finding Procedure, 20 IND. & LAB. Rav. 1 (1966); Comment, supra note 146, at

275-88.
148. See Mica. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 423.207, 423.25 (1967).
149. For example in Massachusetts, of 200 public employee cases submitted to fact
finders, 140 were resolved prior to recommendations. In Michigan 56 percent were
resolved prior to recommendations. See Gov'T EMPLoYEz REL. REP. B-3, No. 283
(Feb. 10, 1969). Of course, these proceedings involved disputes relating to collective
bargaining agreements, but a similar procedure could be developed within a university's
institutional procedures. See Smith, supra note 77, at 898.
150. For contract disputes, this is the method used in Michigan and New York.
See Mic-. Comp. LAws AN. § 423.25 (1967); N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAw § 209-3(c)
(McKinney Supp. 1968).
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based upon persuasion and voluntary agreement rather than adjudica151
tion.

(3) Arbitration
Since fact-finding does not guarantee the dissolution of a bargaining
impasse, some authors argue that it is not effective, and recommend the
use of binding arbitration as the only effective alternative to the strike. 52
This argument is usually advanced citing the following premises: (1)
collective bargaining is desirable; (2) strikes are undesirable; (3) the
only way to avoid strikes is to provide a substitute; and (4) the most
effective substitute is binding arbitration. 153 Most states have accepted
the first two premises and are now beginning to experiment with variations of the latter two, emphasizing voluntary procedures.
Arbitration may be statutorily compulsory, or it may be voluntarily
entered into by mutual agreement of the parties. The procedure provides that a neutral third party will resolve disputes by deciding the
issues. Compulsory arbitration, despite its occasional attractiveness to
the public, is seldom used, except in the case of certain critical employees such as firemen or policemen.15 Since teachers or college professors have not been placed in that category, only voluntary arbitration
is discussed.
Voluntary arbitration, which may be advisory or binding,'55 also is
not extensively used by public employers.', It may include two general
151. Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 67 MicH. L.
REv.943, 967 (1969).
152. R. DoHERTY & W. OERER, supra note 59, at 104; Note, Legality and Propriety
of Agreements to Arbitrate Major and Minor Disputes in Public Employment, 54
CoRNELL L. REv. 129 (1968).
153. R. DOHERTY & W. OBF.aR, supra note 59, at 104.
154. E.g., Mich. Pub. L. No. 312 of the Public Acts of 1969 (authorizing binding
arbitration of unresolved collective bargaining disputes involving police and firemen);
PA. STAT. tit. 43, § 217.7 (Supp. 1970); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-9.1-9 (1968) (firemen); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-265 to 27-276 (1957). Other "critical employees" include
public transportation workers, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:890(E) (Supp. 1970); PA. STAT.
tit. 55, § 563.2 (1964) (toll bridges and toll roads); public utility workers, NEB. REv.
STAT. §§ 48, 801-23 (1968), and hospital employees, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.36 (1966)
constitutionally upheld in Fairview Hosp. Ass'n v. Public Bldg. Serv. & Hosp. Inst.
Emp., Local 113, 241 Minn. 523, 64 N.W.2d 16 (1954), noted in 39 MINN. L. REv. 322
(1955) and discussed in Note, supra note 152, at 139-40.
155. In effect, advisory arbitration is fact finding, see ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
5 965 (Supp. 1970-71), just as fact finding which is binding is actually arbitration.
156. ALAs. STAT. 5 23.40-010 (1959); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, § 301 (1960); NEB.
REv. STAT. H5 48-801 to -823 (1968); NJ. STAT. AN. § 34.13(A)-7 (1965); N.Y. Civ.
SRav. LAW § 207 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
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types of arbitration: (1) "interests" arbitration, which decides the substantive terms of a new contract, thereby resolving a bargaining impasse;
and (2) "grievance" arbitration, which settles disputes over the interpretation of an existing contract. 157 Only grievance arbitration is discussed, because it is doubtful that college and university administrators
will relinquish or otherwise delegate their contractual powers (assuming they can) to a neutral third-party without the existence of some
type of agreement which limits the scope of the arbitration.'- 8 Although
it has been estimated that ninety-five percent of all union contracts
negotiated in private industry contain provisions for arbitration of either
grievances or interpretations of the contract,'5 9 relatively few of these
provisions exist in public employment. 10 In teachers' contracts, however, despite claims and predictions of illegality, binding arbitration by
a neutral third-party is becoming increasingly common?"- A recent
administrative decision in Michigan held that since the state had comprehensive bargaining laws imposing a duty to bargain on public
employers, binding arbitration as the last step in a grievance procedure
was a mandatory subject of bargain."'
At the university level, since 1968 the University of Michigan has
had collective bargaining agreements with three unions representing
non-academic employees. Each contract contains provisions calling for
binding arbitration as the final step in the grievance procedure. 6 3 The
157. Comment, supra note 146, at 279-80.
158. Thus far the agreements have been collective bargaining agreements, but it is
conceivable that accord could be reached on a joint university-faculty grievance
procedure without collective bargaining.
159. C. SCHMIDT, JR., H. PARKER & B. REPAs, A GUIDE To CoLLECrIvE NEGOTIATIONS
IN EDUCATION 70 (1967).
160. See GOV'T EMPLOYm REL. REP. A-i, A-2, No. 183 (Mar. 13, 1967).
161. Early court decisions held that arbitration of grievances by governmental
employers was an unlawful delegation of power, e.g., Mugford v. Mayor and City
Council, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1945); however, this began to change in 1951
when the court in Norwalk Teacher's Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d
482 (1951) held that specified grievances could be considered.
162. Oakland County Sheriff's Dept. v. Local 23, AFSCME, No. C-66, F-63 (Mich.
Lab. Mediation Bd.) reprinted in Gov'T EMPoym Ra. REP. F-i, No. 227 (January 8,
1968). Other cases involving similar holdings are Local 953, AFSCME v. Benton
Harbor School Dist., Civil No. 6229(B) (Mich. Cir. Ct. for Berrien County, Oct. 12,
1967) reprinted in Gov'T EMPLOYEE RaL. REP. E-1, No. 216 (Oct. 30, 1967). Some
state statutes specifically allow grievance arbitration, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 290.350
(1965); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 178K (Supp. 1968). See also Note, Labor La'wPublic Employment-Arbitration and Agency Shops As Mandatory Subjects of
Bargaining, 14 WAaNE L. REv. 1238 (1968).
163. Address by William Lemmer, University of Michigan Attorney, Arbitration, Use,
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University Attorney has evaluated the effectiveness of arbitration under
a collective bargaining agreement at the University:
It is difficult for a union to justify a work stoppage when arbitration is available.... Not many [grievances] are taken to arbitration, because our answers, based on application of our agreement,
are usually correct.
Consequently, I believe that arbitration is the best available practical method for resolving disputes during the life of a collective
bargaining agreement. In addition, it provides the psychological
value of having an outsider available to tell us who's right when
we act in a way the union thinks violates our contracts.,.
Thus, arbitration may be the method selected by many universities as
their institutional procedure for final dispute settlement should a collective bargaining relationship develop.Y0

(c) Coercion
If none of the described approaches has resulted in a satisfactory resolution of the dispute, resort is often made to the use of coercion.
Whereas the user of persuasion seeks to influence the result, perhaps

modifying his own views in the process, the user of coercion seeks to
force the other party, by use of varying degrees of power, to submit
to his terms. In a labor relations context on college campuses, methods
of coercion may vary in degree from sanctions to academic strikes.

(1) Sanctions
Sanctions might arguably fit under the persuasion approach; however
it has been said of sanctions, that when used adroitly they can prove
Value and PrecautionsIn Institutional Labor Contracts,National Association of College
and University Attorneys, June 17, 1970 (unpublished). Mr. Lemmer noted that from
1968 to June, 1970, two unions, the Operating Engineers and the Trades Council,
representing small bargaining units (no figures given) filed fourteen grievances; whereas
the larger union AFSCME filed 900 grievances, twenty-four of which were scheduled
for arbitration.
164. Id. Mr. Lemmer limits these remarks to "collective bargaining agreements."
Rhode Island has passed a law permitting binding arbitration on teachers and the
school board, solely for a limited range of issues, "not involving expenditures of
money." R.I. GEN~. LAws ANN. § 28-9.4(11) to -13 (1968).
165. This is the case at City University of New York where its agreement with the
Legislative Conference contains such a provision.
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to be a far more devastating weapon than the strike. 1 6 Therefore, realizing their ambivalent nature, they are discussed under the heading of
coercion.
The object of using sanctions is to hurt the other side to such an
extent that its position will be changed. The types of sanctions fall into
three general categories: political, educational, and economic.
Political sanctions rely on the use of the political process to bring
about the resolution of issues, for example, by sending faculty delegations to the legislature or governor to petition for a particular cause on
which the administration will not alter its view. This method, however, is cumbersome for resolution of particular disputes at a campus
and better lends itself to broader problems arising at the legislative level.
Educational sanctions are frontal attacks on the institution or the
administration's professional standing. It may take the form of censure
17
by the faculty or by an external organization such as the AAUP,
which can have the effect of an employment boycott. 168 One commentator assessed the AAUP's method of censure as follows:
This censure is in fact AAUP's most potent weapon. By publicly
denouncing the institution, and relating the facts and circumstances surrounding the serious breach of academic freedom, the
association seeks to marshall the forces of public opinion.1 9
Another sanction with far-reaching consequences is an attack on the
accreditation of an institution. This is accomplished by petitioning ap166. Neirynck, supra note 5, at 303.
167. As of March, 1970, a total of 23 colleges and universities were censured by
AAUP for violating its standards on academic freedom and tenure. 56 AAUP BurL. 3
(March, 1970).
168. Ferguson, supra note 13, at 795. An external organization may also exercise
sanctions on its members, for example, by expelling a member who violates the
organization's sanctions against a particular university. See generally M. MosKow,
supra note 116, at 200; and regarding the NEA, see Neirynck, supra note 5, at 302-04.
See also note 172 infra.
169. Brown, supra note 27, at 169. For a detailed analysis of the AAUP's censure of
St. John's University (N.Y.), see College and University Government: St. John's
University (N.Y.), 54 AAUP BuLL. 325 (1968). An extraordinary measure of censure
was levied by the AAUP when it took the position that "it would be inappropriate for
our members to accept appointments at St. John's University." 55 AAUP BuLT. 308
(1969). A distinct disadvantage of the AAUP's use of censure is the time lapse between
the time the Association is asked to intervene and the time it publishes its report,
which is about two years. Brown, supra note 27, at 169.
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propriate authorities to revoke the institution's accredited standing. 17
Because of the relative ease with which censures or petitions for withdrawal of accreditation may be initiated and the fact that such actions
will often cause most administrators to re-examine their position, educational sanctions have had broad appeal.'
Economic sanctions are measures taken by a faculty which are used
to impair the ability of an institution to use or attract resources necessary for effective operation. These measures are designed to cause the
institution to limit the use of its facilities or otherwise lose revenues,
thus bringing about an adverse economic impact on the university. Such
sanctions include publicizing disputes which are unfavorable to the
administration, encouraging student boycotts, refusing to accept extracurricular responsibilities, or the withholding of services either by
means of a strike or by one of its more colorful variations, professional
study days, mass sick days, slow downs, etc. Naturally, the application
of any given measure will depend on the goal to be attained and the
amount of pressure necessary to achieve it. The techniques described
above are merely illustrations and are limited only by the powers of
imagination.

(2) The Academic Strike and Its Proprietyas Viewed by ExternalRepresentative Organizations
The ultimate economic sanction that faculty members can impose is,
of course, the strike, often euphemistically referred to as "withholding
of services." Although strikes have not traditionally been used by faculties in higher education, under some circumstances their use has been
sanctioned by every external organization seeking to represent university
faculties. There is no reason to believe that present anti-strike legislation will inhibit college and university faculties any more than it has
other public employees. In recent years there has been an increasing
number of strikes by college and university faculties over both academic
and non-academic subjects. 2 Some view this as a shift from professorial
commitment to a competitive power play which damages a faculty
member's professional status.1 7 Regardless of how it is viewed, it is
170. A possible problem of seeking withdrawal of accreditation is that, if granted,
it may persist beyond the life of the problem which caused it.
171. TAsK FoRcE REPORT, supra note 4, at 49.
172. See Ferguson, supra note 13, at 804.
173. Kadish, supra note 54, at 164.
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evident that notions of professionalism, academic freedom, and all those
factors which are weighed in a professor's decision when selecting a
type of organization to represent his interests will be considered in
determining whether it is appropriate for a faculty member to strike.
The several external representative organizations have expressed their
views on the propriety of the academic strike. The AAUP, in 1968,
after years of decrying the inappropriateness of the strike, announced
in a policy statement that although it believes the strike is an inappropriate mechanism for the resolution of most conflicts within higher education, it does not follow that the strike should never be used. For
example,
situations may arise affecting a college or university which so fla-

grantly violate academic freedom (of students as well as faculty)
or the principles of academic government .

.

. that faculty mem-

bers may feel impelled to express their condemnation by withholding their services either individually or in concert with others. 1 4
Further, the AAUP says that "a strike is clearly inappropriate when it
does not have positive educational objectives," for example, a strike in
support of college service employees or a strike to dramatize some
national or international political position.17- These types of strikes
"could not be countenanced by a professional organization like this
Association." 1-7 Additionally, the AAUP has stated that it emphatically
rejects "the industrial pattern which holds the strike in routine reserve
for use whenever economic negotiations reach an impasse." 177 It would
seem then, that the AAUP would likely recommend strike action only
over academic rather than economic issues.
The NEA has stated that while it does not recommend that its affiliates
strike, "strikes have occurred and may occur in the future" in which
case the Association "will offer all of the services at its command to the
affiliate concerned to help resolve the impasse." 1.7 It does not distinguish
between academic and non-academic issues.
The AFT's position on strikes has consistently been that faculties
should have the full rights accorded to private sector employees, includ174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Policy on Representation of Economic Interests, supra note 98, at 157.
Id. at 158.

Id.
Id.
Muir, supra note 7, at 624.
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ing the right to strike. 179 Collective bargaining is viewed as ineffective
without the strike or the threat of a strike, and either will be used without hesitation when the situation demands it.
From its study the Task Force concluded that higher education is not
so essential that society would be threatened by its temporary cessation.
Additionally, suppression of strikes would be more destructive to the
institution in the long run than a strike, itself. Therefore, it adds,
...there are no decisive reasons why the faculty should be denied
the opportunity to strike.... If the administration has denied the
faculty the right to participate effectively in campus decisionmaking, then it must accept a major share of the responsibility
when a strike ensues.' 80
Recent experience has shown that faculties can and do strike even
without any affiliation with a labor organization. Therefore, in a decision to choose between either an academic senate or a labor organization
(or any other external representative organization), the latter can no
longer argue that its strike policy provides it with a power no faculty
senate could possess. It should be noted that faculty senates in colleges
and universities have rarely struck over non-academic subjects such as
wages and perhaps therein lies the decisive difference between a faculty
senate and a labor union.
In summary, it would appear that whether a faculty's interests are
represented by an internal or external organization, the use of the academic strike is a viable possibility. Thus, there seems to be harmony
on the issue of whether a strike can be used, but "with respect to the
propriety of faculty strikes, dissonance persists." 181 Perhaps the best
observation at the present time is that
[t]here have been too few strikes in higher education, public, or
private, to permit useful analysis of their etiology or pathology.
Nor can one predict with any confidence what will or should happen when a strike is unsuccessful and the striking faculty members
82
are replaced or dismissed'
179. Ferguson, supra note 13, at 795-96.
180. TASK FORcE REPORT, supra note 4, at 51-52.
181. Brown, supra note 18, at 1079.
182. Id. at 1080.
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2. Constraintson Public Employer Decision Making
The public employer negotiating the settlement of a dispute must
consider constraints placed upon it by several forces outside its control,
including market conditions and political, financial and legislative limitations. An internal or external organization representing a faculty will
likely analyze and acknowledge that a public employer is to some extent
limited by these forces. It is necessary that they be considered in formulating strategies so that appropriate procedures for dispute settlement
can be utilized in attempting to obtain faculty requests. For example,
if the public employer has conceded on economic demands up to the
limits that the legislature has allocated for non-academic matters, what
effect will an economic sanction such as an academic strike have on an
administration or legislature in obtaining salaries above that amount? To
the extent that a strike cannot obtain demands nor influence their realization, it would not be the appropriate sanction. Of course, any influence a particular sanction has, must be evaluated by the party using it.
The more common constraints placed on public employers are discussed
below.
(a) Market Constraints
It has been suggested that the natural difference of market places in
which private and public employers compete makes the use of a strike
inappropriate. 3 In other words, unlike the private sector, labor conflicts in the public sector are not between relative equals who are subject
to free market economic forces working their own restraints on behavior.' 4 Therefore, a strike will not put a public employer out of
business. Public employers have no ability to raise the prices of services
rendered, to subcontract work out, to move to another location or to
shut down permanently.as Likewise, it is argued, public employers
183. See Burton & Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YAiE L. J. 418, 425 (1970). For a contrary view see Wellington & Winter,
The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 79 YALE L. J. 1107
(1969).
184. See generally Hilebrand, The Public Sector, in J. DumxoP & N. CAIMBERIAIN,
FRONTERS OF CoLLECrv BARGAINING 151 (1967).
185. Weisenfeld, Public Employees Are Still Second Class Citizens, 20 LAB. LJ. 138,
142 (1969). In this regard it has been stated that "teachers rarely need fear unemployment as a result of union-induced wage increases, and the threat of an important
non-union rival (competitive private schools) is not to be taken seriously so long
as potential consumers of private education must pay taxes to support the public
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may not appropriately employ sanctions against its employees in the
same way private employers do. 8 "

The basic legal difference between public and private employers is
the lack of a profit motive in the public sector. 8 7 Whether this distinc-

tion is real for purposes of labor relations is arguable, but to those who
advocate its validity, it provides a further basis for claiming that collective bargaining techniques such as the strike are inappropriate in the
public sector.' 8 Put another way, it is said that if an academic strike

occurs, "the consequence of delay in the educational process of students ought not to be equated with the loss of profits to an industrial
concern."

'19

Therefore, an academic strike will not economically hurt

the public employer to the extent that a strike in the private sector
will, and it will not necessarily influence or cause the public employer
to meet employee demands.

(b) Political Constraints
Political constraints placed on public employers also determine the
latitude by which they may act in resolving disputes. To some extent,
they are prohibited from acting arbitrarily because as public employers
they are subject to political considerations. It has been stated that "all
agree that the services performed by some public employees are in one
way or another 'essential' and that this 'essentiality' is in some sense
school system." Wellington & Burton, More on Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE
L. J. 441, 442 (1970).
186. For example, "lock-outs and the use of allies" in the event of employee
strikes would be inappropriate on the college campuses. See Ferguson, supra note 13,
at 780.
187. R. DOHERTY & W. OBa.xa, supra note 59, at 61. Likewise, it is argued, with the
profit motive absent, the consequent motive of public employers to exploit public
employees is also diminished. Id.
188. For example, in Norwalk Teachers Assn. v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83
A.2d 482, 484 (1951), the court stated: "under our system, the government is established by and run for all the people, not for the benefit of any person or group. The
profit motive, inherent in the principle of free enterprise, is absent. It should be the
aim of every employee of the government to do his or her part to make it function
as effectively and economically as possible."
189. Ferguson, supra note 13, at 780. A parallel argument continues, "[oln the
contrary, trustees, regents, and board members have nothing to gain by depressing
our salaries. They have no personal financial interests in the matter and they win
prestige only as they provide stipends high enough to attract the most capable scholars
and scientists among us to their institutions. Their prestige in fact is wholly dependent
upon the prestige of the faculties they manage to recruit and retain." Representative
of Economic Interests, 52 AAUP BULL., 229, 233 (1966).
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related to society's ability to tolerate strikes."' 9 ° Although policemen
and firemen can be included in the definition with minimal controversy,
a problem may arise when applying that term to education. While
teachers may not be essential in that a teacher's strike might endanger
public health or welfare, it may seriously inconvenience parents and
other citizens who, as voters, may seek to punish the political leadership.' 91 Such pressure on the political leadership and legislators may
sometimes help open the state's treasury to resolve labor disputes. This
type of political constraint is typically felt by public employers in the
field of education. 92
The argument is made that political pressure cannot be distinguished
from economic pressure since the objective of each is to influence executive and legislative determinations such as the allocation of funds and
the tax rate.9 3 This may well be the case in academic strikes where

often the economic pressure brought to bear against a university administration which has exhausted its resources is in actuality a demand to
the legislature and taxpayers for more money.
(c) Financialand Legislative Constraints
Financial and legislative constraints are the greatest restraining forces
on dispute settlement by public employers. Even if the employer wants
to meet its employees' requests it may have no options open to it other
than to use its influence to attempt to remedy the situation on the legislative level. Obviously, if finances are not available, there will be continued dissatisfaction among public employees who are demanding
higher salaries. Without the "flexibility to meet at least the minimum
of employee demands," it has been suggested that strikes and lesser work
94
stoppages will continue among public employees.
In addition to the unavailability of funds, there may be related problems dealing with the coordination of the budget-making process with
the negotiation process. For example, state law may require a university
to submit a budget proposal by a certain deadline, which may be prior
to the end of negotiations. A preliminary budget will be proposed based
190. Wellington & Burton, supra note 185, at 441.
191. Id. at 442.
192. It has been stated that public education is "close to the taxpayer's heart and,
as a general proportion, his blood pressure tends to rise as the prospect of a loss of
one of these services increases." Weisenfeld, supra note 185, at 142.
193. Burton & Krider, supra note 183, at 428-32.
194. Rehmus, supra note 146, at 921, 924-25.
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on estimates of the final negotiated settlement, causing the administration to take a rigid position during negotiations to prevent its estimate
from being exceeded.'O9
Another type of constraint may be legislatively imposed. For example, in Michigan and other states legislation limits the scope of subjects
which may be negotiated by the public employer. 196 Therefore, economic sanctions taken against an administration to force it to bargain
over legislatively excluded subjects are misguided, unless the sanctions
have political implications. 9 7
In view of the number and magnitude of constraints placed on public
employers, careful evaluation by faculty representatives is in order when
planning the appropriate method of presenting requests and when selecting to whom they will be presented. The author suspects, however, that
these constraints will be minimized in the eyes of faculty members.
Absent effective alternatives, academic strikes will continue with pressure brought against administrations to reallocate resources from academic areas of the budget to non-academic areas (such as salaries), and
from one college within a university to another.' 8 The implications
of this approach could well be felt in the future quality of education.
IV.

COLLEGE FACULTIES:

COLLEcTIVE BARGAINING, THE LAW, AND

PoTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS

Collective bargaining is a legal relationship between a faculty and
its administration; therefore, those faculties which choose it as their
means of faculty governance should understand which laws, if any, will
govern their relationship with the administration. Depending on whether
the institution is public or private, the nature of that relationship will
be prescribed by federal or state laws. These laws and the potential
problems of collective bargaining in higher education are examined
below.
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., MiCH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(15)

(1968)

where subjects include "wages,

hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."
197. See generally Note, Collective Bargaining and the Professional Employee,
69 CoLuM. L. REv. 277, 298 (1969).

198. There was an analogous situation in a Michigan public school district where
plans for an expanded vocational educational program were abandoned to meet salary
demands of teachers who were threatening to strike. Rehmus, supra note 146, at
919-20.
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A. Role of Federal Law
Since state educational institutions are excluded from jurisdictional
coverage by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and private
colleges until recently had not had NLRB jurisdiction exercised over
them, college and university administrators have not had to deal with
the operations of the Act nor follow its legal developments.'0 9 However, it is increasingly evident that this legislation "has -made a terrific
impact on all employer-employee-union relations, including colleges and
universities."

200

1. Private Institutions
In a landmark decision involving Syracuse and Cornell Universities on
June 12, 1970, the National Labor Relations Board asserted jurisdiction
over non-profit colleges and universities which meet its jurisdictional
standards. 0 1 In asserting jurisdiction, the NLRB overruled the leading
case of Trustees of Columbia University in which the Board in 1951
declined to assert its jurisdiction over a ". . . non-profit, educational
institution where the activities involved are non-commercial in nature
and intimately connected with charitable and educational activities of
the institution." 202
The NLRB prefaced its holding by noting that union organization by
both non-professional and academic employees on college campuses is
growing and ".. . as advancing waves of organization swell . . . it is
unreasonable to assume that.., disputes will not continue to occur in
the future." 203 The Board then justified its assertion of jurisdiction
by observing that since 1959, after Congress passed Section 14(c) of the
National Labor Relations Act ° which allowed states to exercise jurisdiction when the Board declined to do so, only fifteen states had established labor laws to meet the needs of employees who were denied
199. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (1947).
200. Lemmer, The Impact of Labor Legislation on Colleges and UniversitiesFederal Labor Legislation and jurisdiction, Ta CoucEn CouNsEL, 159 (1967). See
generally Ferguson, supra note 13.
201. Cornell University, 183 NLRB No. 41, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1970). See generally

McHugh, National Labor Relations Board Goes to College, COL. & UNIV. Bus. (July,
1970).
202. 97 NLRB No. 424, 29 L.R.R.M. 1098 (1951).
203. Cornell University, 183 NLRB No. 41, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269, 1275 (1970).
204. National Labor Relations Act § 14(c), added by 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C.
1164(c) (Supp. 1963).
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federal relieL 20 5 Consequently, the Board stated, jurisdiction is asserted
"to insure the orderly, effective and uniform application of the national
labor policy." 206

In deciding that a state-wide bargaining unit was appropriate, the
NLRB applied the tests used in the industrial sector. Noting its inexperience in the educational area, the Board stated that it could reliably
analogize that situation with those experienced in the industrial sector.
We are mindful that we are entering into a hitherto unchartered
prea. Nevertheless, we regard the above principles as reliable guides
to organization in the educational context as they have been in the
industrial, and will apply them to the circumstances of the instant
case.207

It appears that when faculties designate a union, they will be placed in
an industrial relations context, rather than receive special considerations
that some argue are appropriate to the educational area.

The immediate effect of the Cornell University decision on private
colleges and universities is that they, as well as their faculties, will have
NLRB procedures and remedies available to them should a collective

bargaining agent be designated. 08 The long range effect of this decision
raises significant questions for higher education in general:

(1) Since

205. Of the states having labor laws to meet the needs of NLRB-excluded
employees, only eight states have legislation expressly covering employees of private
educational institutions. See Cornell University, 183 NLRB No. 41, 74 L.R.R.M.
1269 (1970). Section 14(c) of the NLRA was passed two years after the United States
Supreme Court ruled that states were powerless to entertain cases which fell within
the NLRB's jurisdiction even though the Board had declined to assert such jurisdiction.
Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957). For a thorough discussion
of this "no-man's land" created when neither federal nor state relief was available,
see Smith & Clark, Reappraisal of the Role of the States in Shaping Labor Relations
Law, 65 Wis. L. REv. 411, 416-18 (1965).
206. Cornell University, 183 NLRB No. 41, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269, 1274-75 (1970).
207. Id. at 1276.
208. It is interesting to note that the University filed the petition asking the NLRB
to assert jurisdiction. Over a year earlier, it had been predicted that this type of
situation might develop, especially in New York, because New York had recently
eliminated the exclusion of private educational institutions from coverage of its state
labor relations act, and that act did not contain provisions restricting labor unions
from engaging in unfair labor practices. To an employer who saw the inevitability
of its employees forming a union, it may well have been wise to seek coverage under
the federal statute to obtain the benefits of the restrictive provisions of the federal
statute, and reciprocal unfair labor practice provisions. See Ferguson, supra note 13, at
784.
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strikes are permitted under federal law, what impact will this have on
public employee collective bargaining where the strike is prohibited by
state law? (2) Will these new rights and remedies for private colleges
and their faculties (e.g., the right to strike, and remedies against unfair
labor practices by either the union or the employer) create a demand
for equal rights and remedies by public colleges and their faculties? (3)
What would be the effect on public educational institutions if private
sector concepts were applied in labor relations matters?
2. Public Institutions
State colleges and universities have been expressly excluded from coverage by the federal law: "The term 'employer' . . . shall not include
any state or political subdivision thereof ... , 209 Neither are their
employees "employees" within the meaning of the Act.2 10 Therefore,
the significance of labor legislation on the operations of public institutions is necessarily indirect, but it is very real.
3. Impact of FederalLaw on Public Colleges and Universities
Although federal law is inapplicable to public colleges and universities, its statutory and decisional principles have long been emulated by
state agencies. Typically, industrial relations concepts are reflected in
state public employee legislation which most frequently is modeled
after the NLRA. 11 Although state agencies often point out that they
are not bound by NLRB decisions, 12 they consistently look to NLRB
and court interpretations of the federal law as guidelines in defining the
state law.
In view of the recent Cornell University decision, there will un209. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(2) (1964).
210. In the following cases, NLRB Regional Directors dismissed representation
petitions on that basis: Board of Regents, The University of Michigan, Case No.
7-RC-1208 (1951, unpublished); Louisiana State University, Case No. 15-RC-3329
(1966, unpublished); and University of Rhode Island (Motor Vessel Trident), Case
No. 1-RC-7773 (1964, unpublished); see Lemmer, supra note 200.
211. See generally Smith & Clark, supra note 205. See also Smith, supra note 77,
at 904.
212. In Michigan, see, e.g., Eaton County Road Commission, Mich. Lab. Med. Ops.
Case No. C67, B-12 and R67, A-16 (1967). However, in a speech before the
Association of Labor Mediation Agencies in August, 1967, Robert Howlett, chairman
of Michigan's state labor board, stated, "Michigan's PERA applies the industrial
procedures of representation, unfair labor practices and collective bargaining to the
public sector." See LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK (1967).
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doubtedly develop a body of decisional law relative to private educational institutions. One can safely predict that state administrative agencies and courts will look to these decisions when faced with similar
situations in cases involving public colleges and universities. The author
suspects that in the future, should collective bargaining gain favor on
the public campuses without coextensive state legislative rights and remedies for public employees and employers, then the same justifications for
NLRB jurisdiction will exist as in the Cornell University case. Public
employers and employees alike may seek legislative changes to allow
coverage under the NLRA. Regardless of whether it is by new legislation or by state application of present legislation, it would appear that
federal private industrial relations concepts will be used in the public
employee sector including the college campus setting, notwithstanding
the fact that federal law presently does not apply to public institutions.

B. State Labor Legislation
As public employees are excluded from coverage under federal labor
law, state labor laws and state judicial decisions govern the legality of
union organization and strikes. 13 Presently there is no state public employee labor legislation which distinguishes between employees in higher
education and those in elementary or secondary education. In fact, very
few states distinguish between public employees in the area of education versus those employed in other areas.214 Moreover, few states have
established different administrative agencies to administer public sector
law and private sector law, which suggests why there is rarely any difference in approach or concept between the two.21 5

1. Anti-Strike Legislation
In recent years, a number of states have enacted legislation providing
213. For a table of state labor legislation see Ferguson, surta note 13, at 786-89.
See Rubin, A Summary of State Collective Bargaining Law in Public Employment,
PUBLIc EmPLOYEE RLAmoNs REPORT No. 3 (New York State School of Industrial
and Labor Relations, Ithaca 1968); Comment, supra note 146.
214. Ferguson, supra note 13, at 786-89. Some authors have taken issue with the
propriety of modeling labor laws which affect college faculties after private industry
models. For example, ". . . recent statutes that legitimize and encourage public
employee bargaining are clearly not even-handed when they are applied to higher
education. They assume the primacy of the trade-union model and ignore the unique
characteristics of the academic community." Brown, supra note 18, at 1073.
215. For a survey of the various approaches taken by states see Smith, supra note 77,
at 898-901.
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collective bargaining rights for public employees, including those employed in education. 1 6 Thus, by legislation or judicial decision, all
states but Alabama appear to have provided for bare unionization of public employees. 217 However, with the exception of Vermont,218 the
states have invariably reaffirmed the traditional prohibition against strikes
by these same public employees. 219 The anti-strike statutes usually
provide for fines, discharge, and loss of employment rights for those
participating in a strike.
Michigan law is exemplary of many state public employee statutes
where on the one hand rights are granted and on the other hand they are
limited. Michigan public employees were granted collective bargaining rights by the 1965 Public Employment Relations Act (PERA). 20
The Act recognizes the right of public employees to join labor organizations, and it specifies election proceedings for the determination of an
exclusive bargaining representative for an appropriate unit. 221 However,

the Michigan law retained the strike prohibition that had existed prior
to its enactment. 222 Several reasons why states have chosen to distin216. See note 213 supra.
217. See International U. of Op. Eng., Local 312 v. Waterworks Bd. of City of
Birmingham, 276 Ala. 462, 163 So. 2d 619 (1964).
218. Vermont has recognized a right to strike for situations in which the exercise
of such right does not endanger the public health, welfare and safety. VT. STAT. Am.
tit. 21, § 1704 (Supp. 1968). See also Smith, supra note 77, at 910, for a similar proposal.
219. See, e.g., State Bd. of Regents v. United Packing House Food and Allied
Workers, Local 1258, - Iowa -,

175 N.W.2d 110 (1970).

220. MicH. Com. LAws AwNl. §§ 423.201-.254 (1967). No distinctions were made for
teachers, although a bill had been introduced which would have granted separate
representation rights to teachers. This had been sponsored by the Michigan Education
Association, which, after the bill's defeat, joined with the Michigan Federation of
Teachers in supporting the bill finally enacted into law. See M. MosKow, supra note
116, at 48.
221. MicH. Comp. LAws ANNtw. §§ 423.201 -.254 (1967). It also prohibits interference
or discrimination by the employer, Mics. Com. LAws AwN. § 423.210 (1967); requires
the governmental employer to bargain in good faith, § 423.215; and provides the employee
with remedies for employer unfair labor practices, § 423.216. It also provides for mediation services when an impasse arises with fact-finding and non-binding recommendations
as the terminal point of the impasse procedure. See note 220 supra.
222. MicH. Com. LAws. ANN. § 423.202 (1967). It has been suggested, however,
that the strike question in Michigan is not finally settled. See Smith, supra note 77,
at 909. The new strike law did repeal several sanctions previously associated with the
strike prohibition; i.e., the 1965 amendment repealed Law of July 3, 1947, No. 336,
§ 4 [1947] Mich. Acts 633, providing for automatic termination of employment for
violation of the Act and § 8, providing criminal penalties for any non-employee
inciting a strike.
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guish between private and public employment on the strike question22
are listed below.
2. Reasons for Anti-Strike Legislation
The traditional reason advanced for banning strikes by public employees is that such strikes constitute an impermissible interference with
the sovereignty or governmental function of the state, and reflect adversely on the employees' loyalty. 24 In a recent case where striking
teachers were enjoined, an Illinois court declared that "the underlying
basis for the policy against strikes by public employees is the sound and
demanding notion that governmental functions may not be impeded
or obstructed ....
," 225 In a recent New York case where striking
teachers were enjoined, the court explained its rationale:
From time immemorial, it has been a fundamental principle that a
government employee may not strike. In this sensitive area, neither
labor-the public employee-nor management-the governmental
agency-in their mutual interdependence can afford the indulgence
of arbitrary self-interest at the expense of the public.2 26

As yet there has been no United States Supreme Court decision on the
anti-strike question and only occasionally will a court raise objections
to the present system. 2
Another argument is that anti-strike legislation is constitutional only
when the health, safety and welfare of the public are endangered; therefore, a qualified right to strike should be given to those employees whose
striking would not interfere with essential services, i.e., those relating
to the public's health, safety and welfare.22 8 The difficulty with this
223. See also Anderson, supra note 151, at 956-60.
224. See generally id. at 959; Neirynck, supra note 5, at 305; Smith, supra note 77,
at 909.
225. Board of Educ. v. Redding, 32 IMI.2d 567, 571-72, 207 N.E.2d 427, 430 (1965);
other pronouncements using this rationale have been: "Such action, looking forward
toward the paralysis of Government by those who have sworn to support it, is
unthinkable and intolerable.. .. It is the first step toward anarchy." Teachers v. Board
of Public Instruction, 69 L.R.R.M. 2466, 2468 (1968).
226. Board of Educ. v. Shanker, 66 L.R.R.M. 2308 (1967).
227. R. DoHERTY & W. OBERER, supra note 59.
228. Anderson, supra note 151, at 949. It has been argued, however, that as advisable
as that might be, the current political climate is not receptive to the qualified right to
strike for public employees. Gov'T. EMPLOYEE REL. REP. E-l, E-9, No. 268 (Oct. 28, 1968).
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"essentiality" test is defining it. There are those who advocate prior
legislation in those areas which are essential.2 29 Others insist that the
decision on the essential nature of a service cannot be made in advance
of a strike, because in each case there are varying factual circumstances which should be considered by the courts or an impartial agency
which would then render a decision on an ad hoe basis2 0 Policemen
and firemen are usually the groups singled out as performing essential
services requiring special no-strike legislation2 3 1 As yet, educators have
not been placed into this category, although some states do have specific
legislation covering teachers apart from other public employees. 32
A final argument, and one which forms the theoretical basis for much
of the and-strike legislation, is the conviction that ". . . the political
process can be substituted for the strike weapon as an orderly method
of dispute resolution." 2 3 3 Since bargaining in the public sector concerns
the allocation of public resources, it is a political matter and one requiring a political settlement rather than economic coercion; if policies are
disliked, new officials should be voted into office. The strike cannot
be part of the negotiating process in the public sector because constraints on the market place affect collective bargaining in private employment, whereas the constraints on public employment are imposed
by the democratic political process.2 " Often courts will seize upon
this point to justify the prohibition of public employee strikes. For
example, in a recent case upholding New York's Taylor Law ban on
strikes the court stated:
The necessity for preventing goods or services being priced out
of the market may have a deterrent effect upon collective bargaining negotiations in the private sector, whereas, in the public
sector, the market place has no such restraining effect upon the
229. See Arthurs, Collective Bargainingin the Public Service of Canada: Bold Experiment or Act of Folly?, 67 Micr. L. REv. 971 (1969).
230. Shanker, quoted in Gov'T. EMwLoYEE Re. REP'. B-5, No. 276 (Dec. 23, 1968);
see also Burton & Krider, supra note 183, at 432-37; and, Wellington and Winter, supra
note 185.
231. See, e.g., Mich. Pub. L. No. 312 (Aug. 14, 1969); PA. STAT. tit. 43, § 217 (Supp.
1970). Most often the denial of the right to strike is coupled with compulsory arbitration. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 151, at 949 n. 26.
232. See note 213 supra.
233. Anderson, supra note 151, at 953.
234. See generally Burton & Krider, supra note 183, at 425-28.
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negotiations and the sole constraint in terms of the negotiations is to5
2
be found in the budget allocation made by responsible legislators. P
If the political process were not substituted for the strike, and a policy
of permitting strikes by public employees were adopted, there would,
in effect, be a transfer to such employees of all legislative, executive, and
judicial powers now vested in duly elected or appointed officials.23
Whichever justification a state uses to uphold anti-strike legislation,
the events of recent years indicate that they are not accepted by public
employees who are walking off their jobs in increasing numbers.
3. The Apparent Ineffectiveness of PresentAnti-Strike Legislation
(a) Strikes Continue
In 1967, Robben W. Fleming,.President of the University of Michigan and a noted labor expert, stated that if laws and society are not in
harmony on the question of strikes a destructive confrontation could
result.
In my judgment the danger that any strike against the government
will undermine our democracy is counterbalanced by the equally
dangerous contempt for the law which results from the prohibition
of all strikes and leads to its frequent violation. If this prohibtion
continues, either it will lead to this contempt for the law, or there
will be great public pressure for it to be applied against strikes in
23 7
the private sector as well.
That the no-strike law was ineffective as applied to secondary and
elementary teachers became apparent soon after legislation was passed
permitting public employees to organize. Prior to 1966, teachers' strikes
were relatively infrequent. Between 1960 and 1965, there was a total
of twenty-five strikes involving 44,000 teachers. There were thirtythree in 1966, eleven in the first quarter of 1967,138 and one hundred
and thirty in 1968.2 9
235. City of New York v. DeLury, 23 N.Y.2d 175, 186, 243 N.E.2d 128, 133-34,
295 N.Y.S.2d 901, 909 (1968).
236. Seitz, School Boards and Teacher Unions, 141 AMER. ScHOOL BD. J. 11 (Aug.
1960).
237. Fleming, Introduction in FRONTIERS OF CoLLEcTivE BARGAINING 1, 11-12 (1967).

238. Glass, Work Stoppages and Teachers: History and Prospect, 90 Moi-rrmy LAB.
REv. 43, 45 (Aug. 1967). Eleven of the strikes of 1966 were by NEA affiliates, twenty
by AFT affiliates and two by independent organizations. The average teachers' strike
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In higher education, academic strikes have not been as frequent. However, they have been occurring. In 1966, after twenty-two faculty
members of St. John's University (N.Y.) were suspended, the first major
faculty strike against a university administration occurred.240 In 1967,
there was a class boycott by teachers against the administration of Catholic University for not retaining a faculty member.24 ' Both of these strikes
were primarily directed at educational and administrative policies. At
Chicago City College, a strike which had primarily economic aims resulted in recognition of a union and salary increases. 24 In the spring of
1970, some faculty members of the University of Michigan stayed away
from classes to support student demands for a greater allocation of
resources to minority students.
(b) Definitional Strike Problems and the Laws' Circumvention
Part of the problem in public employee strikes is to ascertain when a
strike legally occurs. Should a general strike prohibition be construed
to include a variety of concerted actions undertaken to advance collective bargaining aims even though they may be something less than a
formal strike? For example, do "professional study days," "slowdowns," "blue-flu" (policemen), "white-flu" (nurses), "mass resignations," and refusals to sign individual contracts constitute strikes within
the meaning of state legislation?243 Although the above techniques may
help to circumvent the literal wording of many statutes, some states, such
in 1966 lasted 1.8 classroom days compared with 14.1 man days for strikes by industrial
employees. Id. at 43. Also in 1966, only sixteen of the strikes were over salaries
or hours, whereas nine were over questions of representation and eight had to do
with school conditions and policies. Id. at 44. See also Susskind, Teacher Strikes!!
What Can Be Done About Them, 49 MicH. S. B. J. 28 (Feb. 1970); Kheel, Strikes
and Public Employment, 67 MIcH. L. Rnv. 931 (1969); Neirnyck, supra note 5. In
Michigan there were 11 teacher strikes in 1965-66, Rapoport, Militant Public Employees,
Wall St. J., Aug. 9, 1966, at 14, col. 4, and in 1967 there were 36 teacher strikes,
11 by MFT affiliates and 25 by MEA affiliates. C. RERmus & E. WMER, supra note 6,
at 4.
239. Wollett, GovT. EMPLOYE RE. REP. B-6, No. 337 (Feb. 23, 1970). In 1967-68,
it was reported that of 114 teacher walkouts in all states, 47 occurred in Michigan.
Gov'T. EMPoYEE REL. REP. B-9, No. 276 (Dec. 23, 1968).
240. Ferguson, supra note 13, at 804.
241. Id.
242. Marmion, Unions and Higher Education, EDuc. REc. (Winter, 1968).
243. See generally R. DosmRTY & W. OBERER, supra note 59, at 102; M. MosKow,
supra note 116, at 197; Kheel, supra note 238, at 935; Smith, supra note 77, at 915.
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as Michigan, have gone to great lengths to define strikes conceptually
44
and functionally.

Whether imaginative attempts to circumvent anti-strike legislation
will be successful may well depend on court interpretations.2 The
language in the Michigan statute would seem to be comprehensive
enough to include concerted action short of total work stoppage, if such
action is designed to change the conditions, compensation, rights, privileges or obligations of employment. However, it appears that it will
not include many types of faculty action where the motive is not to
affect an employment relationship, but is designed to affect educational
and public issues.24 As most anti-strike laws are presently written, such
conduct would be outside the proscription of the statutes and, therefore,
remedies such as an injunction would be unavailable to the employer. 247
These legal remedies would not be needed, however, since the professor's
conduct would not be a protected concerted activity which would protect him from discipline or discharge for failure to fulfill his duties.
Whether present laws could be expanded to proscribe such activities is
doubtful because of the serious constitutional problems this would raise
regarding the restriction of free speech and the enforcement problem.
(c) The Enforcement Problem
The larger and more difficult question is: Once employees are said to
244. Michigan law not only defines strike, it elaborates on when a public employee
is deemed to be on strike. See MicH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(1) and (6) (1968) respectively.
245. In cases involving employee activities short of refusals to work under unexpired
contracts, the following have been construed as strikes: NEA's "Sanctions," Board of
Educ. of Union Beach v. New Jersey Educ. Ass'n, 53 N.J. 29, 247 A.2d 867 (1968),
involving blacklisting of school district; Board of Educ. of New York v. Shanker,
54 Misc. 2d 941, 283 N.Y.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1967), involving purported mass resignations; refusal by firefighters to engage in routine or administrative work, Gov'T.
EMPLOYEE REL. REP. B-9, No. 271 (Nov. 18, 1968); airport traffic controllers "sick out,"
Gov'T. EMpL.oYEE REL. REP. A-9, No. 302 (June 23, 1969). For a general discussion
of the use of strike substitutes in the public sector see Wortman, Collective Bargaining
Strategies and Tactics in the Federal Civil Service, 15 LAB. L. J. 482, 489 (1964).
246. For example, in 1970 some of the faculty at the University of Michigan
"withheld their services" over the issue of allocation of resources to black students.
This type of problem is not necessarily limited to higher education; as was recently
noted: "Public employee strikes increasingly involve disputes over social policy as
well as over conditions of employment." Anderson, supra note 151, at 955.
247. This may depend on whether a particular court hearing the case can find that
the social or educational dispute which prompted the walkout was related to "terms
and conditions of employment." Most often, however, social issue strikes are short and
do not always command full participation, and it is therefore unlikely that an employer would need to seek legal remedies.
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have engaged in an illegal strike, will the law be enforced; and if so,
what sanctions will the court impose?
Sanctions for violation of anti-strike laws were more punitive in the
248
past than today on the theory that they would deter future strikes.
However, it was found that the punitive approach did not effectively
prevent public employees strikes.249 When enforcement is discretionary
with the employer, sanctions are rarely invoked since dismissed employees may be hard to replace, and it would only tend to exacerbate
the existing situation.250 Moreover, since a strike occurs after negotiations break down, sanctions applied at this point may encourage employee militancy and a continued break-down of negotiations.251 Injunctive sanctions with the threat of contempt citations often raise cries of
involuntary servitude from the employees which can result in adverse
public relations for the school administration.252
The use of injunctions against striking teachers, with contempt cita248. New York's Condon-Wadlin Law, before its repeal, provided for the automatic
dismissal of striking employees with the provision that any striker subsequently rehired
could not receive higher pay for three years following the strike, and would remain
on probation for five years. Law of March 27, 1947, ch. 391, § 1, [1947] N.Y. Laws
842, as amended, Law of April 23, 1963, ch. 702, [1963] N.Y. Laws 2432 (repealed
1967). Under New York's new Taylor Law penalties against the union include loss
of dues, check-off privileges, and withdrawal of recognition. Penalties against the
employees include, for each strike day an employee must have the equivalent of two
days pay deducted from his paycheck. Ch. 24, § 8 [1969] N.Y. Laws 42-43 (McKinney
Supp. April 10, 1969), amending N.Y. Cxv. SERv. LAW § 210(2) (McKinney Supp.
1968). In Board of Educ. of New York v. Shanker, 54 Misc. 2d 941, 283 N.Y.S.2d
548 (Sup. Ct. 1965), a fine of $150,000 was assessed against the United Federation
of Teachers for conducting an 18-day walkout against New York City's public school
system. The state trial court also levied a $250 fine and imposed a 15-day jail
sentence on the union president for contempt of a court order. See Susskind, supra
note 238, at 29. Minnesota law is similar to the Condon-Wadlin Law, see Mrmi. STAT.
ANN. § 179.55 (1966). In Michigan all statutory sanctions have been removed except
for the employer's discretionary right to dismiss or discipline a striking employee, and
its impact is diminished by the statute's procedural safeguards for the employee.
MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 423.206 (1967).
249. See Neimynck, supra note 5, at 305-07; Comment, supra note 146, at 269-71.
250. Seitz, Public Employee Negotiatingand School Board Authority, LaGAL PROBLEMs
OF SCHOOL BoARDs 144-146 (A. Rezny ed. 1966); Comment, 33 U. Cm. L. Rav. 852, 860
(1966).
251. N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1967, at 36, col. 8, noting that the Detroit School Board
did not seek an injunction because the dispute would be settled more easily over the
bargaining table.
252. The argument that the use of an injunction in public employee labor disputes
violates the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude and abridges
freedom of speech has not won court approval. See Comment, supra note 146, at 266
n.36.
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for their violation, has recently been limited in Michigan. In School
District v. Holland Education Assn," ' a strike was enjoined and the
teachers were ordered to refrain from further strike action. On appeal,
the Michigan Supreme Court held that even though the courts have the
power to issue injunctive relief against strikers in the public sector, they
are not required to do so in every case. When a strike occurs, the employer must also show that irreparable harm to the public will result
from the strike. 4 The court stated that
dions

... it is insufficient merely to show that a concert of prohibited
action by public employees has taken place and that ipso facto such
a showing justifies injunctive relief. We so hold because it is basically contrary to public policy in this State to issue injunctions
in labor disputes absent a showing of violence, irreparable injury,
or breach of the peace.a55
An employer seeking an injunction in Michigan must now meet that
burden of proof as well as show that he bargained in good faith and
was not the cause of the strike.a56 It is arguable that the court's decision
has established a qualified right to strike for public employees in those
situations where it will not irreparably injure public interest. Since
strike legislation means little without enforcement machinery, it is submitted that a legislature can give tacit recognition to the right to strike
by public employees by leaving judicial decisions like the Holland Educ.
Ass'n unchanged, and without taking the politically hazardous approach
of passing legislation to that effect.
253. 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968).
254. Susskind, supra note 238, at 29.
255. 380 Mich. at 326, 157 N.W.2d. at 210. Thus, in effect, the court applied the

standards for enjoining strikes by public school teachers that it has applied to strikes
by employees in the private sector. Although it has no statute similar to the NorrisLaGuardia Act restricting the use of injunctions in labor disputes, Michigan courts
have developed a policy against issuing injunctions absent a showing of violence or
irreparable harm. Id. See also Cross Co. v. Local 155, UAW, 371 Mich. 184, 123
N.W.2d 215 (1963).

256. In effect, the employer must now have "clean hands" before an injunction will
issue. 380 Mich. at 327, 157 N.W.2d at 211. This approach had been recommended
earlier in ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, REPORT TO GOVERNOR
ROMNEY 15 (February 15, 1968). The New Jersey Supreme Court recently considered
this issue in Board of Educ. of Union Beach v. New Jersey Educ. Assn., 53 N.J. 29, 43,
247 A.2d 867, 875 (1968) and held that clean hands was no bar to injunctive relief
when public welfare might be harmed. For a general discussion of School Dist. v.
Holland Educ. Ass'n, see Comment, supra note 146. For a summary of how various
states approach this problem, see Smith, supra note 77, at 910-14.
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In summary, the increasing incidence of public employee strikes,
despite their illegality, suggests that present legislation is ineffective.
The fundamental inconsistency between granting a right to bargain
collectively while at the same time prohibiting strikes as a means of
supporting bargaining demands also suggests that new methods of dispute settlement may be needed.2 7 In assessing whether the strike prohibition in public employment is a realistic and equitable policy or
whether it must give way to a limited and qualified right to strike, it
has been noted:
... I very much doubt that public sector strikes will wholly disappear. My guess is that their incidence will rise as the areas of organization and collective bargaining in the public sector expand.
If this prognostication is accurate, there -will be further support
for the thesis that strikes cannot really be prevented. Unless we
accord public employees at least a limited right to strike, we will
be in danger-and perhaps already are-of according a kind of de
facto recognition to conduct officially declared illegal. This state
of affairs is scarcely desirable in any society which purports to
N 25
order its human relations according to the processes of law.

C. PotentialProblem Areas of Collective Bargainingin
HigherEducation
Most areas of collective bargaining are not yet developed in higher
education; however, as law does develop there may be several concepts
which present courts, state labor boards, and college faculties with
great difficulties. Exclusivity of a bargaining agent, the definition of
appropriate bargaining unit, establishment of the scope of bargainable
subjects, and the role of a faculty senate, are concepts which are just
beginning to develop and not necessarily in a uniform direction.

1. BargainingAgent as Exclusive Representative
When an organization has gained the allegiance of a majority of the
faculty, a question arises concerning the exclusivity of the bargaining
agent: Should the majority organization have the exclusive right to
represent all persons within the appropriate unit, thereby depriving all
257. Perhaps a better suggestion is embodied in the adage that legislators "should
stop worrying about strikes and start worrying about what causes public workers to
strike." Burton & Krider, supra note 183.
258. Smith, supra note 77, at 917.
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other organizations of any direct voice in the bargaining process? Exclusive negotiating rights have been defined as the "right[s] and obligation [s] of an employee organization designated as majority representative to negotiate collectively for all employees, including non-members,
in the negotiating unit." 25 9
Exclusive representation can serve several important functions including: (1) placing responsibility upon one organization so that if employees are dissatisfied they know whom to blame; (2) providing a
unified front for the employees; and (3) fixing the responsibility of the
employer who is required to meet with a single representative. Supporters of the principle of granting a bargaining agent exclusive rights
for a certain period where an agreement can be negotiated without
challenge by another organization,26 ° contend that it is a necessary
precondition for the development of a sound and stable bargaining
relationship.""
The alternative to exclusivity is proportional representation, which
allows multiple representatives of faculty members to deal with the
administration. Proportional representation is attractive to some, especially at multi-universities, because by definition it allows minority
representation.2" This must be balanced, however, against the possibility of chaos resulting from the lack of a unified faculty voice. As one
author stated:
Proportional representation... divides the representation on the
teachers' side, transfers to the bargaining table the competition of
views between the contending teacher organizations instead of resolving them at the representation stage, and thereby impairs the
process of reaching agreement....=2s
259. LIEBERMAN & MosKow, COLIvE
SCHOOL ADMINISRATION 421 (1966).

NEGOTIATIONS FOR

TEAcHERs-AN

APPROACH TO

260. In Michigan, as under federal law, a state labor board certification permits a one
year "grace period" to reach an agreement during which time competitive organizations
may not seek recognition. Once an agreement is reached this "bar" may be extended
over the life of the agreement up to three years per agreement. See MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 17.455(14) (1968).
261. TASK FoRcE REPORT, supra note 4, at 46. NEA and AFT both favor this, the
exclusivity principle, see R. DoERTn, & W. OBERER, supra note 59, at 76.
262. See generally Sims & WmTTR, TEA-CRs, AvMNisTRAToRs, AND CourncTvE
BARGAINING 136-37 (1968). This, of course, should be distinguished from a single
organization such as a faculty senate where representatives may be selected on a
proportional basis. The type under discussion deals with e.g., the AAUP representing
20 percent of the faculty, the NEA 20 percent and the AFT 20 percent, all meeting
with the administration over matters of common concern.
263. R. DoHERTY & W. OBEREE supra note 59, at 75.
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Another argument against proportional representation is that without
exclusivity there is a possibility that the employer might favor minority groups in an attempt to undermine the majority position. Opponents
24
point to the same possibility when there is an exclusive representative.
The major opponent of exclusivity has been the AAUP which believes that a professional organization should always have access to governing powers so that it can promote and help the realization of
professional ideals.aes In addition to the fear of losing access to university officials, the AAUP advances the admonition "that exclusivity will
combine with a broad range of bargainable issues to exclude the faculty's
internal agencies from any meaningful role in governance." 20 That is,
the exclusive representative would likely assume responsibility over
matters formerly of concern to a faculty senate, thus squeezing the
senate out of meaningful participation. Even though the AAUP has
taken the position that it will act as an external agency, it is not ambivalent in its opposition to exclusivity. It urges any of its components
that may achieve representative status to create an orderly procedure
within the faculty governmental structure "for prompt consideration of
problems and grievances of faculty members to which procedure any
individual or group shall have full access." 267 In states not having applicable legislation, these issues can be perplexing.268 Michigan law and
federal law, grant the right of exclusivity. 209

2. AppropriateBargainingUnit
Once the decision is reached whether or not the representative is to
be granted exclusive bargaining rights, the question of over whom the
agent exercises these rights arises. That is, what is the appropriate bar264. It should be noted that where there are "multi-universities" within the same
governing system, the concept of proportional representation appears to be more
viable, and a master agreement could be reached with supplemental agreements covering
the problems of individual campuses.
265. Brown, supra note 18, at 1072.
266. Id. at 1076.

267. Policy on Representation of Economic Interests, supra note 98, at 154 (emphasis
added).
268. For an example of a recent decision prohibiting a university from granting
exclusive bargaining rights, absent legislation, to a group of non-academic employees,
see State Bd. of Regents v. United Packing House Workers, Local 1258, 175 N.W.2d 110 (1970).
269. MicH. STAT. ANNm. § 17.455(11) (1968).

Iowa

-
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gaining unit? 270 Usually this decision is made by an administrative body
of government, such as the NLRB for private sector employees and a
state agency for public employees. The issues will revolve around-who
are members of a faculty? Who are supervisors? Are researchers,
librarians, instructors, and teaching fellows included? Should institutional practices be controlling, or should general standards used by
colleges and universities throughout the state or nation be sought? The
usual industrial approach in answering these questions is to determine
those academic persons having a sufficient community of interest. They
will be the appropriate bargaining unit. In a recent election among
faculty members at City University of New York, the New York Public
Employment Relations Board established two units by distinguishing
between those positions in which the occupants were eligible for aca271
demic tenure and those in which they were not.
In Michigan, although not answering the question of the appropriate
composition of a bargaining unit, the Supreme Court has indicated the
approach to be used by the state labor board in its determination. It
directed the state's administering agency, MERC, "to designate as the
appropriate unit, the largest unit, which in the circumstances of the
particular case, is most compatible with the purpose of the law and to
include all common interests in a single unit." 2 72 The appropriate unit
among academic personnel at a particular university will depend on the
nature of the university (day and night program? multi-campus?). It is
submitted that the proper approach to this problem is not to make uniform rules to be applied to all universities, but rather to use an ad hoc
approach as suggested by the Michigan case above.
Another problem deals with who are supervisors and whether they
should be excluded from an appropriate employee bargaining unit. Most
states uniformly exclude supervisors as does the National Labor Relations Act.2 73 That rule has been followed in Michigan,2 74 although there
270. See generally PRAsow, UNIT DETERMINATION IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT-CONCEPT
(1969).
271. McHugh, Collective Negotiations in Public Higher Education, COL. & UNIv.
Bus. 42 (Dec. 1969). A delineation was made between about 6000 part-time and
temporary faculty members and about 5000 full-time faculty. N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1968,
at 56, Col. 1. Additional problems, not discussed here, can arise in bargaining unit questions
if a university is part of multi-university system as was the case in New York.
272. Hotel Olds, 333 Mich. 382, 53 N.W.2d 302 (1952).
273. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1954) excludes supervisors from collective bargaining units. The Michigan Public Employment Relations
Act, however, permits supervisors to form their own collective bargaining units.
AND PROBLEMS
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are several recent cases indicating that supervisors in education may be
treated differently from their public employee counterparts. Two state
labor board decisions held that supervisors may maintain membership
in an employees' union, but they may not participate in activities which
pertain to the union's status as a collective bargaining agent,2 70 such as
voting in elections, holding office, and attending internal business or
labor relations meetings. If they engage in activities which would interfere with the organizational rights of the employees or support the labor
organization, they are guilty of committing unfair labor practices.
In
one case, Michigan's labor board stated:
It is common knowledge that in the field of education, employee
associations have traditionally been active in many areas to the mutual benefit of their members. Only recently, under the amendments to PERA have they assumed the new role of collective bargaining representative for teachers. There is no reason to conclude
that such activities and endeavors will not be continued. We see
no reason for prohibiting executives and supervisors from belonging to such organizations for the purpose of participating in the
benefits that may accrue to them.2 77
However, in a recent court case involving the question of whether
non-academic supervisors (engineers) for a public school district could
form a union, the court stated that the state labor law ". . . does not
prohibit those employees engaged in executive or supervisory positions
from organizing, but only that they shall not be included in a bargaining unit containing non-supervisory employees in the same plant or
business enterprise." 278 Whether this statement is intended to broadly
See, e.g., Hillsdale Community Schools, 1968 Mica. EMaowyMsmNrr REL. Comhe'
LAB. Ops. 859; School District v. Labor Mediation Board, 73 L.R.R.M. 2787 (Feb. 1970).
274. See, e.g., Henry Ford Community College, 1969 MicH. Em LoyAw.rNT Ra.
COM-M'N LAB. Ops. 64. Contra, Southwestern Michigan College, 1969 MicH. EMPLOYAMENT RE. CoA'N LAB. Ops. 89.
275. School Board of City of Grand Rapids, 1966 MicH. EMPLOYmENT RFL. CoM.'N
LAB. Ops. 282; Livonia Public Schools, 1967 MICH. EMPLOYA=nT RET. Comma'N LA.
Ops. 282; Livonia Public Schools, 1967 MICH. EMPLOYMENT REL. COMM'N LAB. Ops. 780.
See also, Clary, Pitfalls of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 18 LAB. L. J.
406, 410 (1967).
276. Michigan Public Employment Relations Act, Micm. STAT. ANN. REv. § 17.455(10)
(1968).
277. School Board of City of Grand Rapids, 1966 MicH. EmPLOYMENT REL. COMM'N
LAB. Ops. 282.

278. School Dist. v. Labor Mediation Bd., 73 L.R.R.M. 2787 (Feb. 1970).
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cover academic personnel in higher education or is limited to nonacademic public employees is unknown.27 9 However, the literal wording
of the state's public employee law does not explicitly prohibit supervisors
from inclusion in an appropriate bargaining unit.
Moreover, in a recent state labor board unfair labor practice proceeding, a trial examiner held that a Michigan State department's faculty
organization was not employer-dominated and ".... it is unrealistic...
to apply NLRA principles to the system of self-government by the
university faculty or to equate college administrators... with... foremen and supervisors in a manufacturing or retail entity." 280 In summary, at the present time it appears that the usual rule of disallowing
supervisors in an employee bargaining unit may prevail, but there are
indications it may be reexamined in view of the needs of higher educatlion.

3. AppropriateScope of Subjects for Collective Bargaining
(a) Academic versus Non-academic Subjects in Higher Education
Since faculty members are both professionals and employees, their
interests span a wide range of substantive issues. There is a somewhat
reflexive compulsion to label educational policies as academic issues and
economic considerations as non-academic issues. With these two basic
issues in mind, it is worth a thorough analysis to examine the subjects of
concern to faculty members and determine in which category they fit.
There are some who argue that in higher education there can be no
distinction made between academic and non-academic issues.
The fundamental fact, of course, is that every budgetary appropriation-whether it has to do with more buildings, or secretaries,
or research, or salaries, or leaves, or whatever-is justified, in a college situation, precisely on the grounds of its contribution to
better education. 2 s '
A similar argument is made, perhaps somewhat cynically, that if a collective bargaining agent were designated, then all matters of faculty
279. For example, perhaps this ruling is limited to supervisors participating in an
employee unit rather than just being a non-participating member.
280. Michigan State University (University College, Dept. of Social Science),
Case No. C691-123, MIcH. E pLoYmENT Rm. COMM'N LAB. Ops. 14 (June 24, 1970).
281. Larsen, 'Collective Bargaining'Issues in the California State Colleges, 53 AAUP
Buiu. 217, 222 (1967).
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concern would become related to terms and conditions of employment,
since these are the only areas over which they are permitted to bargain.
Once a bargaining agent has the weight of statutory certification
behind it, a familiar process comes into play. First, the matter of
salaries is linked to the matter of workload; workload is then related directly to class size, class size to range of offerings, and range
of offerings to curricular policy. Dispute over class size may also
lead to bargaining over admissions policies. This transmutation of
academic policy into employment terms is not inevitable, but it
is quite likely to occur.2s 2
Notwithstanding this admonition, the terms academic and non-academic can and often do have wider meanings. Traditionally, professors
have sought to establish criteria for admission into the profession and to
enforce their own standards of good practice. They often seek effective
influence in policy decisions on admission standards, curriculum content,
degree requirements, grading standards, academic freedom, standards
for student conduct and discipline, and procedures for appointment of
department chairmen, deans and presidents. Finally, they seek to determine the conditions which affect the standards and quality of work
performance such as promotions, tenure, course assignment, work sched28 3
ules, work loads, allocation of space and secretarial help
In assigning these subjects to the general categories of academic and
non-academic issues, it should be noted that each issue may fall into
one of two overriding categories: issues affecting the faculty as a whole4
8
and issues having a special relevance for the individual faculty member
This dichotomy is important when establishing procedures to resolve
disputes, for a procedure to define faculty salaries may be inappropriate
to questions of broad educational policy.
The Task Force Report on faculty governance has identified four
broad categories of issues that are the legitimate concern of the faculty.
They are: (1) educational and administrative policies, (2) personnel
administration, (3) economic issues, and (4) public issues and the
institution2 5
282. Brown, supranote 18, at 1075.
283. See generally TAsK FORcE REPORT, supra note 4, at 27-32; Wollett, supra note 58,
at 1023.
284. TAsK FoRce REPORT, supra note 4, at 30.
285. Id. at 27-30.
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(1) Educational and Administration Policies
Since administrative procedures often determine the process by which
educational policies are implemented, they can be treated together. The
basic issue is the mission or general direction an institution will take.
The classification includes admission standards, content of curricula,
degree requirements, grading standards, standards for academic freedom,
standards for student conduct and discipline, and procedures for appointment of department chairmen, deans and presidents. These issues, most
often concerning the faculty as a whole, are central to the educational
program and define the professional role of a faculty member in his
relationship to the university community. For this reason, any system
of faculty governance should permit the faculty a leading role in making decisions affecting these interests. It is foreseeable that an administration, in an adversary setting, might argue that these subjects are management prerogatives, not requiring faculty consideration.
(2) PersonnelAdministration
This category would include appointments, promotion and tenure,
course assignments, work schedules, work loads, the allocation of office
space, secretarial help, and procedures for handling disputes and grievances. These issues often involve problems of equity and may engender
explicit adversary interests of the faculty and the administration. It is
in this area that the professor may find himself torn between the desire
for professional autonomy and the desire as an employee to be treated
equally and have better working conditions. In that regard, faculty
members are interested in having a forum to present grievances. At the
present time, in most institutions individual grievances are referred to
successively higher levels in the administrative structure. Subjects in
personnel administration may be classified as non-academic and it appears
that substantial faculty influence in the process of policy formulations
is needed to maintain fundamental concepts of professionalism.
(3) Economic Issues
In addition to a faculty member's obvious concern with the amount of
his own compensation, and with the problems of interpersonal comparisons of ability and performance, there are at least three other economic
areas which may concern him: 286 (1) the legislative budget allocations to
286. Id. at 29-30.
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his particular institution, which will determine whether educational objectives of the institution can be met; (2) allocation of available resources
within major budgetary categories of the university, such as distribution
of funds among faculty salaries, new buildings, etc.; and (3) the specific
allocation of the above funds among various schools, departments, and
ranks within the institution. Common problems in this last area include
the distribution of salaries among the colleges of the university and
among the ranks of the faculty. In many institutions in recent years
where pressures to increase faculty size required hiring new and young
personnel, there has been an accompanying increase in salaries for junior
faculty members, but not for senior members.28 7 Obviously these issues
would fit within the non-academic classification.
(4) Public Issues and the Institution
This category involves the institution's policies on questions having a
direct and important effect on its operations, such as the proper relationship between government agencies. An example might be the
R.O.T.C. relationship with institutions of higher education. It is foreseeable that colleges and universities will become increasingly involved
in questions dealing with social problems and educational programs to
meet them. Therefore, it is likely that faculties, as well as students, will
have a larger role in speaking out on public issues that may not directly
affect the university or the faculty member in his employment relationship, but which nevertheless will affect the institution's image. A
topical example might be a faculty resolution against American involvement in the Viet Nam War. It is necessary that policies be made with
respect to the extent and propriety of faculty members' engagement in
these activities. These issues are somewhat related to issues of educational
and administration policies and therefore would most likely be classified
as academic subjects, although there may well be instances where they
could arguably be non-academic.
The classification of academic and non-academic issues might suggest
the subject areas which would be included and excluded from the scope
of bargaining issues should collective bargaining develop at an institution.
Clearly, these issues would be handled differently by different representative organizations, and a faculty will seek to obtain that form which
it feels is most appropriate to its needs and the issues under consideration.
287. Id. at 29.

324
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(b) Legal Scope of BargainableIssues
As a faculty decides which type of organization it will choose to
represent its interests, it should consider which areas affect its interests
most directly, and which areas are most often at the root of disagreements between faculty and administration. If disagreements are primarily over non-academic subjects, then clearly a faculty's choice is
among any of the alternative forms of representation or combinations
of them. On the other hand, if they are primarily over academic subjects, then a question can be raised whether a collective bargaining agent
could or should negotiate on these subjects. Does the administration
have a duty to bargain over academic matters? Are these subjects more
properly left to decision by an internal organization? Are such decisions
residually retained by the administration as a management prerogative?
Although management prerorgatives might well be the result, there are
strong arguments against such a result, and suggestions that a collective
bargaining agent should involve himself in academic matters.
Private sector unions generally do not quarrel with the position
that the ability of a private firm to determine such matters as the
kind and quality of its products or services is and should remain
a managerial prerogative. However, there are some categories of
employees in the public sector who, by virtue of the nature of
their occupations and professional interests, might claim to have a
negotiable concern with the "mission" or goals of particular public
agencies. For example, public school teachers may reasonably
assert that they have a legtimate interest not only in compensation
and "conditions" of employment, but also in the fundamental edu28 8
cational policies to be followed in a school system.
Novel legislation could avoid this issue by excluding certain subject
matter from the scope of collective bargaining in higher education. It is
still too early, however, to tell whether this would be preferable to state
legislation calling for a ".

..

broad duty to bargain, modeled on the

NLRA, which would leave legal questions to be decided by the courts
and policy questions to be decided by the processes of collective
2 89
bargaining."
288. Smith, supra note 77, at 909. See also Klaus, The Evolution of a Collective
Bargaining Relationship in Public Education: New York City's Changing Seven Year
History, 67 MIcH. L. REv. 1033, 1042-46 (1969); Wollett, supra note 58, at 1019-21.

289. Smith, supra note 77, at 904.
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The Michigan act of 1965 was patterned after the NLRA prescribing
a general obligation to bargain collectively on "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment." '0 NLRB interpretations of these
subjects have enlarged their scope for employers that are subject to
NLRB jurisdiction, to include as mandatory subjects of bargaining matters of pensions, bonuses, group insurance, grievance procedure, safety
practices, seniority, procedures for discharge, layoff, recall, or discipline
and the union shop. 9 1 On non-mandatory subjects the parties are free
to bargain or not, but an employer's refusal to bargain over mandatory
subjects results in the commission of an unfair labor practice.
Cases discussing the scope of bargaining issues for public employees in
education are relatively rare. In City of Madison v. Wisc. Emp. Rel.
Bd.,292 it was held that teachers could not be deprived of the right to
bargain over traditionally mandatory issues simply because these issues
have a significant effect on non-labor policies. The employer had
changed the school calendar, contending that this was a matter for consultation but not negotiation with the union. The court disagreed and
upheld the State Board's finding that the school calendar had a direct
and intimate relationship to the salaries and working conditions of the
teachers because it established the number of days worked and the dates
of the beginning and end of the school year.2 3 The court relied on a
United States Supreme Court decision which held that the particular
hours to be worked by butchers was a mandatory subject of bargaining
under the NLRA. Though not directly responding to whether the
school calendar was an issue of educational policy, the Wisconsin court
stated what might be the result if the issue were purely academic. "The
contents of the curriculum would be a different matter. Subjects of
study are within the scope of basic educational policy and additionally
are not related to wages; hours and conditions of employment." 294
The lesson to be learned from this case is that the courts in all likelihood
290. See National Labor Relations Act, § 8(d) and 9(a), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 159(d),
159(a) (1964); MIcH. Coviip. LAws ANN. § 423.11 (1968).
291. See generally Note, supra note 197. For a listing of typical "non-economic"
matters in public school collective bargaining agreements, see REnzrus & WnzER, supra

note 6, at 28.
292. Joint School Dist. No. 8, City of Madison v. Wisc. Employment Rel. Bd,
37 Wisc. 2d. 483, 155 N.W.2d 78 (1967). This case involved a proceeding by a
school board to reverse the order of the WERB which had directed that fact-finding
procedures be instituted with respect to the dispute over the 1966-67 contract.
293. Id. at 490-91, 155 N.W.2d at 81-82.
294. Id. at 493, 155 N.W.2d at 82-83.
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will not hesitate to define educational policies and other non-mandatory
subjects of bargaining by interpreting the terms related to wages, hours
and conditions of employment. A question which remains unanswered
is whether, absent legislative specification, courts will interpret the above
terms narrowly or broadly in determining the relationship between
educational policies and economic conditions; and whether the courts will
continue to analogize NLRB cases with those involving teachers and
professors. An example of a future problem in higher education may be
the question of class size. A broad construction would find this issue
to be a mandatory subject of bargaining since the employer most likely
would contend that smaller classes are economically unfeasible rather
than educationally undesirable. Such a finding could promote additional
conflicts between the employer and its faculty. To grant the faculty's
demand for smaller classes may require a university to adjust an educational policy, perhaps by reducing the number of class offerings in the
curriculum. Thus, it is difficult to reconcile the issue of whether class
size would primarily concern "reasonable working conditions for the
teacher"-an economic consideration, or "what would be the best learning conditions for children-an educational policy decision." 295 Of
course, collaborative discussions between faculty and administration are
not precluded and agreement can be made dividing authority over this
issue and others.
As stated earlier, precedents on the question of the proper scope of
bargainable issues are scarce and for the most part deal with secondary
rather than higher education. It is not always clear whether analogies
made between the two are proper. It would be profitable to watch the
developing law in this area to determine whether those faculties in higher
education which choose a collective bargaining agent for economic
issues might also have chosen one for some academic issues. Professor
Donald Wollett, professor of law at the University of California at Davis,
recently stated that despite what state statutes may declare as proper
subjects for collective bargaining, a good rule of thumb seems to be:
"If the organization has much bargaining power, everything is negotiable. If it has little or no bargaining power, nothing is negotiable." 296
295. For a discussion of similar problems in New York's public education system,
see Klaus, supranote 288, at 1042-47.
296. Wollett, supra note 1, at B-8.
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4. The Role of a Faculty Senate
(a) At an Institution 'witb an External BargainingAgent
Even though an external bargaining agent is designated to represent
faculty members, certain issues of educational policy may properly be
assigned to an academic senate. How stable the relationship will be is
another question. It has been argued that an academic senate would
probably atrophy in the shadow of an external bargaining agent. 91 The
Task Force Report suggests that "the record of collective bargaining
in industrial settings reveals a steady expansion of union concern and
298
influence to topics previously identified as management prerogatives."
By a parallel series of developments, this could take place in higher
education. For example, the determination of admission standards may
initially be assigned to the senate as an educational issue but soon appear
on the bargaining agenda because of the consequences of admission policies on faculty work loads.
Obviously, if a collective bargaining agent is granted exclusive bargaining rights, the role of a senate could be very much diminished, especially if the admonitions regarding the union's desire to expand its
subjects for bargaining materialize. Nevertheless, the Task Force Report
recommends the establishment of an academic senate even when a bargaining agent has rights on a campus. The senate can continue to have
a voice in educational policy decisions and be available to assist the faculty should the bargaining agent's power wane or should a majority
of the faculty reject its representative status.2 9 In Michigan, MAHE
(affiliate of NEA) President Dr. Bruce Nelson stated that a senate and
an organization such as his could compatibly coexist. 00 As to the
AAUP's position, it has long regarded itself as a complementary body
to an academic senate, and there are suggestions that, should it become
a collective bargaining agent on a campus, it will strengthen the senate's
role by contractually limiting the AAUP's jurisdiction over "all sorts of
academic issues," reserving them for "prescribed internal procedures." 311
297. Brown, supra note 18, at 1076.
298. TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 65.

299. Id.
500. Sersing HigherEducation Faculties,Mic. ED.

J. 22 (1967).
301. Brown, supra note 18, at 1078; see also, Letter Number Twenty-one-Relationship
Between an AAUP Chapter and a Faculty Senate, AAUP POLICY DoCUMENT AND
REPoRTs, 1969 ADviSORY LETTEs FROm WAsm aIoN

OFFIcE.
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(b) As Appropriate BargainingAgent
If competing external organizations begin active competition over
who will represent faculty members for purposes of collective bargaining, must the senate stand idly by? The answer depends on the current
status of the law in each state. When a statute permits employee organizations to petition a state board for certification as bargaining representative, who is eligible to participate in an election? Usually any
organization which demonstrates a sufficient showing of interest may
participate. Does a faculty senate qualify as an employee organization?
The issue was first raised in New York where the senate of the State
University of New York petitioned the state's Public Employment
Relations Board (PERB) under the Taylor Law to be included among
choices the faculty would have in an upcoming representation election. s°2
The Board was asked to interpret whether the statutory term "employee
organization" included the senate. °3 In considering this question the
Board naturally considered one of the purposes of the Taylor Law:
"... [P]ublic employees shall have the right to participate in, or to re-

frain from forming, joining, or participating in, any employee organization of their choosing." 304 PERB ruled that the senate was an employee
organization within the meaning of the Taylor Law, because its primary
purpose was to improve its members' terms and conditions of employment. The Board stated that the senate had represented the faculty
position with regard to economic goals as well as a number of matters
of educational concern such as admissions policies, faculty hiring, promotion and tenure procedures, curriculum and class size. It also said
that many of these matters would constitute, to some degree, "negotiable
terms and conditions of faculty employment." 805
At the present time, the issue of whether a senate would be eligible
to be a collective bargaining agent at a given institution retains two
unresolved questions: Can a senate represent the faculty in bargaining
when it includes members from management, that is, from the administration? Does the use of university facilities and the support provided
302. See generally Brown, supranote 18, at 1074.
303. Employee organization was defined as "an organization of any kind having
as its primary purpose the improvement of terms and conditions of employment of
public employees." N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAw § 201(6) (McKinney Supp. 1968).
304. Id. § 202. A semantical problem may exist with some senates where members
do not join, but are members by virtue of their faculty status.
305. McHugh, supra note 271, at 62. This decision was appealed to the New York
courts. As of this date, no decision has been rendered.
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from university funds disqualify the senate, i.e., is the senate thereby
employer-dominated? Both of these questions are novel and have not
as yet been legally resolved, although the second one is presently being
decided in the New York courts.30 6
In the New York case the AFT, a participant in the election, contended that the senate was employer-dominated in that it was an arm
of the university administration because it was incorporated in the university trustees' policies as the official agency through which the faculty
participated in the governance of the university, and because it received
financial support from the university. 307 The AFT felt the senate should
continue to function in academic matters, but another organization
should advance the professionals' interests in collective negotiations
concerning economic matters.
In response, the senate argued that it qualified definitionally under state
law and that if it were deprived of certification as an employee organization under the Taylor Law it would be, as a practical matter, rendered
ineffectual. This in turn would impair the traditional relationship the
faculty has had with the university and inhibit faculty participation in
university governance. Additionally, the senate argued, professionals in
a university have a unique relationship to the university which is far
different from that of industrial employees to management in the industrial sector. Therefore, traditional labor relations rules concerning dominance, financial support, and other unfair labor practices should not
apply.3 08 PERB stated that it would not rule on either the domination
or interference issues, since there were existing state unfair labor practice proceedings available to resolve such issues. 30 9
Although the issue of whether a senate, as a collective bargaining
agent, can have administration personnel in its membership and still
qualify as a labor organization has not been specifically decided in New
York or elsewhere, positions are being taken on the issue. One author
has commented that an administration's financial support of a senate
does not make it dependent on the administration, nor does it interfere
with its autonomy. In stating that it would be ill-advised for an admin306. Of course it would appear that the problems could be avoided by excluding
administrators from membership and by funding itself, as for example by charging
senate members dues.
307. McHugh, supra note 271, at 44.
308. Id. at 61. See also Gov'T. Es pLoyma R.L. RE'. B-11, No. 312 (Sept. 1, 1969).
309. Id. at B-13.
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istrative agency, rather than the faculty, to determine whether the
faculty is independent, he argued that
. . . public support for a faculty senate, without distinction between its bargaining and other functions, is just as much a proper
cost of the university's operation as is support for the administration or for the state labor relations board.310
In Michigan a body of administrative decisions suggests that a university-funded, mixed senate would qualify as a labor organization and
engage in collective bargaining. As noted earlier, recent state labor decisions indicate that administrators in education may be treated differently
from other groups of public employees. 31' In the Michigan State University case,3 12 the trial examiner stated that on the question of employerdomination by a faculty organization with administrators in its membership, it must be proved that the administrators interfere with employees'
choice to speak freely or to join a labor organization which will bargain
with the University. In deciding the case he stated:
[However] the undersigned is refusing to mechanically apply to a
large university regulated by PERA the traditional concepts relative to a charge of domination or assistance of a labor organization under Section 8(a) 2 of the [NLRA]. It is unrealistic to apply
NLRA principles to the system of self-government by the University faculty.... 1 3
Although the Michigan State case concerned only one particular governing faculty, the holding supports the arguments raised by the senate
at the State University of New York that traditional rules concerning
dominance, financial support, and other unfair labor practices should not
apply.3 1 4 If the trend among college faculties of designating collective
310. Brown, supra note 18, at 1074-5. The author admitted, however, that "a state
legislator might not take this view of an appropriation that would be used in part
to extract even greater appropriations for faculty salaries." Id.
311. See text accompanying notes 276-283 supra. A recent New Jersey statute
attemps to avoid difficulties associated with qualifying as a labor organization by
permitting "any organization ... by public employees ... to act on [their] behalf .. .
N.J. STAT. AiN. § 34:13A-3(e) (Supp. 1968).
312. Michigan State University (University College, Dept. of Social Science), Case
No. 691-123, MIcH. EmrLoymErNr REL. COMM'N LAB. Ops. 14 (June 24, 1970).
313. Id.
314. See note 308 supra.
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bargaining agents continues, academic senates will undoubtedly attempt
to qualify as labor organizations.
Should a senate, after qualifying as a labor organization and participating in a representation election, lose that election, a problem arises as to
its subsequent function. Although it would be excluded from bargaining over terms and conditions of employment, it would still retain its
sphere of influence over matters of academic importance to the same
extent as it had before participating in the election. It is clear that a
senate has nothing to lose by participating in a representation election.
V.

CONCLUSION

In recent years, faculties of a minority of institutions of higher education have rejected traditional methods of self-government and have
looked instead to the trade-union model. As faculties consider the alternatives, three areas of discussion arise: professional status, higher salaries,
and participation in self-government.
By established custom, professors are independent persons who seek
a type of self-government which can maintain their ideals of academic
freedom, professional autonomy, and professional status. To many professors, the thought of a faculty union poses a threat to these ideals
because they believe a union, with its industrial relations concepts, would
encroach on their professional status. As professors see the present
structure of public employee legislation, they have every reason to believe that these concepts would be applied to their situation.
Professors typically concern themselves with academic rather than
non-academic matters. Whether some of the academic matters would
be taken over by a collective bargaining agent is not certain; yet it is
likely that some academic areas might be of legitimate concern to a union
and therefore be a subject within the legal scope of bargaining.""
Another area discussed by faculties considering alternative types of
government is higher salaries which, many professors argue, a union can
315. See text accompanying notes 288-296 supra. Recent negotiated collective bargaining agreements between faculty and administration at City University of New
York and Central Michigan University show that the traditionally academic or
potentially academic subject areas of sabbaticals, teaching load and schedule, research
requirements and committee assignments are now covered by contract provisions. This
information is collected and further commented upon in an unpublished paper by
this author. R. Brown, The Faculty Senate as an Effective Alternative to Collective
Bargaining in Higher Education: The University of Michigan Experience (Aug. 1970)
(LL.M. Thesis, University of Michigan).
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obtain more successfully than a senate 3 16 Salary gains by junior college
teachers and some college faculties who have unionized are attractive
to faculties who as yet are undecided on which system of self-government to adopt. Although this desire for higher salaries should not be
minimized, studies show that it is not this factor which leads to faculty
discontent and persuades them to form a union, 17 but rather it is their
lack of ability to participate in decisions affecting their professional
status.3 18
In conclusion, therefore, it is hoped that with the controversy of
union versus senate thus exposed and the criteria underlying the arguments pro and con listed and analyzed, a faculty facing a choice in this
area can make an informed decision between methods of self-governance
in the context of their own situation.

316. In a recent study by this author comparing salary and fringe benefits gained
by faculties at City University of New York and Central Michigan University with
the faculty at the University of Michigan, the following conclusion was reached.
The unionized faculties gained yearly percentage increases of salary greater than
Michigan's non-unionized faculty which uses the senate system of governance. However, the average percentage increases which were about 1.8 to 2.6 percent greater
than Michigan's increases did not result in a disproportionate difference based on average
compensation of the compared faculties. In fact, on the basis of average compensation,
the University of Michigan faculty's compensation far exceeded that of Central
Michigan and slightly exceeded some schools in the City University of New York
system. Id.
317. This proposition and a proposition that a senate system is preferable to a union
was overwhelmingly affirmed in a recent poll taken of members of the University of
Michigan's Senate Assembly. Id. See also TAsk FoRcE REPoRT, supra note 4, at 1, 12-13.
318. R. Brown, supra note 315.

